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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Information Security and Quantum Mechanics:
Security of Quantum Protocols
by
Patrick Oscar Boykin
Doctor of Philosophy in Physics
University of California, Los Angeles, 2002
Professor Vwani P. Roychowdhury, Co-chair
Professor David Cline, Co-chair
The problem of security of quantum key protocols is examined. In addition to the
distribution of classical keys, the problem of encrypting quantum data and the struc-
ture of the operators which perform quantum encryption is studied. It is found that
unitary bases are central to both encryption of quantum information, as well as the
generation of states used in generalized quantum key distribution (which are called
mutually unbiased bases). A one-to-one correspondence between certain unitary bases
and mutually unbiased bases is found. Finally, a new protocol for making anonymous
classical broadcasts is given along with a security proof. An experimental procedure
to implement this protocol is also given. In order to prove these new results, some new
bounds for accessible information of quantum sources are obtained.
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Physics and Information Theory
Physics is the study of matter and energy. This study of matter and energy is almost
always done by considering the states of objects or the environment. The physical
laws concern themselves with the dynamics of physical states. These states are dis-
tinguishable by measurements to varying degrees. In the early part of the last century,
a new branch of physics called quantum mechanics was discovered. This theory pre-
dicts startlingly different dynamics for some systems than do previous theories. A
celebrated result from this new theory is the Heisenberg uncertainty relation, which
states that one cannot precisely measure both the momentum and position of an object.
The Heisenberg uncertainty relation comes from the fact that, in this new theory of
quantum mechanics, the state of a physical object may be thought to be an eigenvector
of an operator representing a physical quantity. A result of quantum mechanics is that
not all quantities have compatible eigenvectors; hence, when a physical object has a
well-defined momentum state, it cannot also be in an eigenstate of position.
Information theory was introduced by Claude Shannon. There are two main prob-
lems with which information theory concerns itself: channel capacity and source cod-
ing. Both problems can be couched in language with which a physicist would be very
comfortable. A channel is a map from input states onto output states. A channel may
be thought of as an interaction: a system is in an initial state; it then undergoes an
1
interaction, which puts it into a final state. The capacity is a measure of correlation
of the initial state with the final state, or how much information the final state has
about the initial state. The source coding problem is also related to physics. A source
is something that outputs states with a given probability. One does not know which
state will come out at each time step, but one does know the probability distribution.
The source coding problem seeks to quantify how much information is required, on
average, to describe an output of the source. Though both of these problem statements
might seem familiar to physicists, it may still come as a surprise that the quantity that
plays a central role in answering both of these questions is also familiar: entropy.
1.2 Entropy
1.2.1 Boltzmann
Entropy is familiar to physicists as a quantity of fundamental importance to the theory
of statistical mechanics and thermodynamics. One of the most celebrated physical
laws is the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which states that entropy of a system can
never decrease. Boltzmann first gave a functional form of entropy as:
Definition 1.2.1 Boltzmann entropy:
 

	
Where
	
is the statistical weight, or the number of microstates consistent with the
observed properties of the macrostate. Further, Boltzmann added two postulates: each
state consistent with the observed properties of the system is equally likely, and in
equilibrium
	
is maximized.
Definition 1.2.2 The inverse of temperature is the partial derivative of entropy with
2
respect to energy:
 
 
  

Instead of definition 1.2.1 we can use the following:
Definition 1.2.3 Generalized Boltzmann entropy of a system with probability of being
in state  is

:
  
	 

  
Since
 
can never decrease, but may increase, the maximum of
 
which is consistent
with observed properties is an equilibrium. So, the probability distribution on the state
of the system is that which maximizes
 
under any set of constraints.
As an example, we begin by considering a system in which a state  has energy


.
Normalization and energy constraints are:  
 
 
and  


 

respectively.
Using usual techniques to maximize given constraints, we have:

 	 

  








Finding the maximum for each

, we differentiate and set equal to zero:




 	    
 


ff

 flfi
Which gives:
 ffi! #"%$'&
(*)
ffi,+
&.-/10

) (1.1)
If we define1 2   
ffi
+
&
-
/
0

)
, then we see that
! 

3
ffi
+
&
-
/
0

)
. Note that 4
3
4
+
&


265

. Putting what we know into the equation for entropy, we find that:
 
  
2
	7ff
 (1.2)
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this definition of 9 is called the partition function
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And applying definition 1.2.2, we can compute   :
  


 
2

2
 
	7ff 	





 
2


2

	

2


ff


	7

 
2


2

	

2

ff




	7ff
 	 ff
Thus we find that
 


 . Pulling it together:
! 

3
ffi

/
( )
.
All of the above is easily generalized to the case of continuous state variables (an
integral takes the place of the sum), or the case of more constraints (such as a volume
constraint). These sorts of approaches constitute the discipline of classical equilibrium
statistical mechanics.
It might be noted that the generalized definition of entropy given in definition 1.2.3
only has to do with probability theory. There are no physical quantities (other than the
normalization constant), only probabilities. Physics only entered the picture to give a
constraint on the probabilities (




 
 ) and the definition of temperature (equa-
tion 1.2.2). We shall see that entropy will play a large role in results in information
theory.
1.2.2 Shannon
Claude Shannon gave a definition of entropy2 as:
Definition 1.2.4 Shannon entropy:
	



 	 

 
 

  
 


We will denote the Shannon Entropy as fiff in order to avoid confusion with a Hamiltonian  .
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Note that this is the same as definition 1.2.1 up to a normalization. While the entropy
was originally given as a function which yields a consistent theory of statistical me-
chanics and thermodynamics, it may be derived axiomatically as the function with the
following properties[CT91]:
  Normalization:
  






 
  Continuity:  
 

 
	 
 is a continuous function of

  Grouping:  
 


ff

     






 	  

  




     






  

 ff

	 
"

"


&


&

"


&

Only the function given in definition 1.2.4 satisfies all these criteria. The first two
axioms should be clear. The grouping property states that the amount of disorder
should partition in a somewhat straightforward way: the disorder of the entire system
should be equal to the disorder of the system when the first two states are considered as
one, combined with the probability of being in the first two states times their disorder.
In addition to entropy, Shannon defined a measure of correlation called mutual
information.
Definition 1.2.5 The mutual information between two random variables 
  is:
	






	



	
	





	



	
 


 


where
 







 
  

	


 
  

. Armed with these definitions,
Shannon was able to show that the number of bits required to describe a source which
outputs state

with probability
 
   
 is
	



. A channel is now a map which
maps input states in


onto output states in  with a transition matrix:
 

 
 


. The channel capacity, which is the number of bits that the output has in common
with the input, is:
	






 



	
	


 


.
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In the following section, we will see how these information theoretic concepts due
to Shannon may be applied to discover physics of information.
1.2.3 Boltzmann Meets Shannon
Physicists have long understood entropy as a measure of disorder, but quantified it
in terms of its connections to energy and temperature. Shannon proved that entropy
is indeed a precise quantification of disorder, as the number of bits necessary to de-
scribe a system. Landauer observed that physics has something to say about erasing
information[Lan61]. If a bit is erased, the information required to describe the system
is decreased by exactly   bit. Using the Clausius inequality, Landauer derived the ther-
modynamic cost of erasing information. Since
 
   
 
, and  	
 	
 
, we
have:

 
	
 
fi
	   	



fi
	




 
Hence the laws of thermodynamics tell us that erasing   bit of energy requires remov-
ing
 

 
of heat from the system.
1.3 Quantum Mechanics
So far we have described the relationship between statistical mechanics and informa-
tion theory saying nothing of quantum mechanics. By now we can see how applicable
information theory is to physics questions; one might wonder how the picture changes
when we allow states to be quantum states. Schrodinger gave us the formula for the
6
evolution of quantum states:
 


 
 (1.3)
where

is the Hamiltonian of the system and

is any vector in the Hilbert space over
which the Hamiltonian acts. In the so-called Heisenberg picture, we consider not the
evolution of the state but the evolution of an operator:





 	 




*fi


which gives rise to a new dynamical equation:

	


	
 

 	
	 *fi


	
Using this new equation, one sees that 4
4
flfi
. Therefore
	 



	 



	
, which is
the definition of unitarity. Hence all evolution in quantum mechanics is unitary.
1.3.1 Quantum Statistical Mechanics
In order to consider how statistical mechanics changes in the quantum picture, we must
define what we mean by a distribution of quantum states. According to the axioms of
quantum mechanics, measurement outcomes are random. However, for any vector in
a Hilbert space, there is always a basis where the probability distribution is a delta
function. A state which cannot be represented as a vector in a Hilbert space 

 is
called a mixed state and is represented by a density matrix:

 

  




 
The entropy of such states is given by:
Definition 1.3.1 Von Neumann entropy:
 



 	








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One may rewrite the Schrodinger equation for density matrices:
 



   

 (1.4)
It is interesting to note that the Schrodinger equation conserves energy for constant
Hamiltonians:

 







 







 


	
 

  





	
 



 

 	





	
 









	






%

	
 









	






 
flfi
If we consider a quantum state in equilibrium, then 4
4
 fi
. Hence
 




fi
, which
means that  has the same eigenbasis as  . If the eigenbasis of  is 




 


     






	
,
with





  

where


is the energy of the  

state, then we may write  as:

 

   

 
Since  is diagonal, the Von Neumann entropy reduces to the Shannon entropy:
 




	
 


ff

     






The energy is









 


. Aside from using a Hilbert space to represent
the states of the system, this is the same as the Boltzmann entropy we considered in
subsection 1.2.1. Using the same techniques of maximization under a constraint, the
density matrix is obtained:


ffi

(*)



*ffi


(
) 

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1.3.2 Deriving the Second Law of Thermodynamics
After seeing some consequences of evolution via the Schrodinger equation, such as
the fact that energy is explicitly conserved, we might wonder what other results we
can prove. The first thing to notice is that unitary evolution of a system does not its
change entropy:
   	

	 

 	 

 	

	      	

	 
 
 	 

 	

	

	  


	


 	 

 	

   


	 

 	








 



Hence a closed system evolving according to the Schrodinger equation will keep the
entropy of the state as a constant of the motion. How then, can entropy increase? When
a system interacts with the environment, the Schrodinger equation will not apply, since
this is not a Hamiltonian interaction unless we consider the system and the environment
together.
In probability theory, there is the notion of marginalizing a variable of a probability
distribution. For instance, if one has a probability distribution      and one is only
concerned with the probabilities over

, the marginalized probability distribution is
easily obtained:
 


 
 



. Marginalization may also be done for density
matrices, and it is called “tracing out” a subsystem. If we consider a system which has
a basis
 



  

 

, any density matrix may be written as:

 
  
 

 



 
  
 

 




	

	 



 


 
  
 

 


	
  


	

Where we have used

to represent the tensor product. We can marginalize over the
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 

subsystem by “tracing out”  :


 

 



 
 

 
 

          

          
 

 	    	 	

 	    

 
 

           

          
 

 	 

   

 	   

 
 

         

          
 

 	 
      

     
 
  

 

       
 

 	 
 
  
  
 

 	 
Where

  


 


 
  
 
.
We need one more definition notion to prove the second law of thermodynamics:
Definition 1.3.2 Relative Von Neumann entropy:
 



 






 



	




 

 

Theorem 1.3.1 Relative Von Neumann entropy is always positive:
 



 


fi
Proof.See [Pre]. Using this definition, we can see that
 

	





 	
 




	





 





 
 	
 




	





  


 



 



%% 
 	
 





 




 



Since
 









fi
, then we see that:
 




 




 

	

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Putting this all together we can see that the second law of thermodynamics is a result
of the functional form of entropy.
Suppose that we have an environment and a system. Initially these two are inde-
pendent:  
-

 


-
. These two systems undergo a Hamiltonian interaction to
become  	  
-
. As we saw in the beginning of this chapter, Hamiltonian interactions pro-
duce unitary evolution. We also know that unitary evolution does not change entropy.
Putting this all together:
  

	
 

   

	
-


  

	
 
-


 
 	
 
-
	



 

 
-


 

 


 


-

Defining 
 


 


	


	
 




, the above implies:

 
 


 
-

fi
As such, the entropy of systems (when considered independently) grows in time.
1.3.3 Quantum Information Theory
The two main problems of classical information theory, namely channel capacity and
source coding, have also been considered in the quantum case. One of the earliest
results answers the question of how much classical information is carried by quantum
systems. Since there are an uncountably infinite number of bases of any Hilbert space,
and uncountably infinite elements in any Hilbert space, one might wonder if quan-
tum states might be able to hold more information than classical states. The answer,
unfortunately, is no[Hol73]. In fact, the amount of information transmitted is always
less than the

of the dimension of the system, just as in classical information theory.
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More precisely, what Holevo showed is that if a source
 
outputs quantum state 

with
probability  , then the maximum mutual information between   and any measurement
is bounded by  , which Holevo defined:
Definition 1.3.3 Holevo  :

   


	


    



which closely mirrors the classical case (see definition 1.2.5). What if the information
is quantum, and not classical?
One can ask the following question: for a given quantum source, how many quan-
tum bits, on average, is required to describe the output? This problem has been solved
in very much the same way as Shannon solved it[Sch95]. The answer is very much
the same: the number of qubits required is the entropy of the source,
 



. While the
question of source coding has been solved for quantum systems, the problem of chan-
nel coding for general quantum channels has not been solved. To prove the capacity
result, Shannon considered correlated inputs over several channel usages. In the quan-
tum case, in addition to correlated quantum inputs, one must also consider entangled
inputs. The solution to the capacity of a quantum channel is still an open problem.
1.4 Secret Communications
Much of Shannon’s work was the result of studies done during World War II, in which
secret communications played a large role. Shannon sought to formalize many aspects
of communication mathematically. If  is the random variable for a message,  is the
random variable for a key, and  is the random variable for the output of the encryption
process, or cipher-text, then we may define informationally secure cryptography in the
12
following way[Sha49]:
	 





  


	  




flfi
  (1.5)
The above relationship implies            , i.e., that the cipher-text,   , is inde-
pendent of the message,

. Since one must be able to recover the message from the
cipher-text given the key, one must also satisfy
	 







  


. Hence, the se-
crecy condition combined with the recoverability condition imply that 




 


and 




 

 for informationally secure cryptography. Of course, we see that
one cannot ”reuse” keys and keep security; that would mean using the same amount of
key entropy on a larger message, and we have already shown that the size of the key is
lower-bounded by the size of the message.
An example of informationally secure cryptography is the one time pad[Ver26].
The message

is compressed to its entropy, and then a full-entropy random string of
length



 is chosen and called

. Then, the cipher-text is
   
. Given
 
, one
knows nothing of

, but given
 
and

, one has

exactly.
So, we have a proof that to get perfectly secure communications, one must first
share a secret key as long as the message. If sharing secret keys were easy, why not
simply secretly share the message? Of course, sharing keys does have advantages:
for instance one may share secret keys in advance and subsequently use them to send
secure communications when sharing keys is not possible. However, these sorts of per-
fectly secure systems are sufficiently unwieldy to prevent any sort of common usage.
If there was a way to know whether an eavesdropper had seen the key or not, one
could tell whether or not it might be safe to use it. Alas, classical information theory
offers no tools which makes this possible. If we apply quantum mechanics, we will
see that we can accomplish this task.
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1.5 Secrecy with Quantum States
Bennett and Brassard proposed a method to distribute secret key bits using polarization
states of photons[BB84]. Their idea was simple: Alice sends polarized photons to Bob,
either up, down, left or right. Bob measures randomly in one of two polarization bases:
up-down or left-right. After Alice sends the photons to Bob, she announces which
basis for each photon, but not which values she sent. They keep the photons where
Bob’s measurement basis coincided with Alice’s transmission basis. The Heisenberg
uncertainly principle says that the photon is either in a eigenstate of up-down or left-
right, but not both3. So if an eavesdropper attempts to listen, she will presumably cause
some errors, since she will project the state into eigenstates of the “wrong” basis about
half the time. By testing a few of the photons, Alice and Bob should be able to detect
an eavesdropper. If there is no eavesdropper, they use their shared secret bits as a key
as described before. This scheme has become known as the BB84 protocol.
As simple as it sounds, it was more than 10 years before full proofs of security
for the BB84 protocol were found[May96, BBB99]. In chapter 2, we will develop
powerful tools for deriving security results and show the fundamental information vs.
disturbance bound which is at work in the BB84 protocol. In chapter 3, we will prove a
security result in the presence of noise. As we cannot know if noise is the result of the
environment or an eavesdropper, steps must be taken to insure security. In chapter 4,
we will see how the picture changes if one wants to encrypt not classical information,
but quantum information. In chapter 5, we will see that there is a relationship between
operators used to encrypt quantum states and the states used in quantum key distribu-
tion schemes. In chapter 6, we will describe a new quantum protocol and prove that
it is secure. This protocol will allow any number of users to efficiently and securely
make anonymous classical announcements. In chapter 7, we will see a prescription for
 
because the operators for these observables do not commute
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an experimental implementation of the quantum protocol for an anonymous channel.
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CHAPTER 2
Tools for Quantum Information Security Results
In this chapter, we will get into some of the fundamental results in quantum informa-
tion security. Most of these results may be viewed as a sort of uncertainty principle for
information. We can sum up the basic property as follows: gaining information in one
basis necessarily causes errors in a conjugate basis.
We will also derive some new distinguishability measures. These are bounds on
the amount of classical information that can be obtained from any measurement of a
source of quantum states. We will extend some previous work[FG99] on such bounds
which turns out be useful for quantum security results. These results are powerful
because they only depend on the source and not on any measurement done. Later,
we will apply these bounds on distinguishability to relate the amount of information
eavesdroppers can obtain to the disturbance they cause in the quantum state.
First, we will generalize a main result in [FG99] to work with the case where the
outcomes are not equally likely; then we will consider the case where the number of
outcomes is unlimited. The result allows us to derive very general information vs.
disturbance results.
2.1 Bound on Mutual Information for 1-bit Sources
Suppose there is a classical source
 
which sends one of two signals; zero or one. Also
suppose that


 
 

 
 . Following [FG99], we first come up with a linear bound on
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  

:
Lemma 2.1.1 For any

	

 
5
 
,
  


  
	

	







  	 
	

Proof.Consider two regions,
  
	
and



	
.
  
 is concave, which means that
 

  
 
	






 

 
 
	


  

. Applying this with
 
	
,

 
5

	
and
  fi
, we obtain:       






, which is exactly what we need for    	 . In the
region



	
we want to show that
  


  
	

   	 



. Again using the concavity,
set
  
	

 
 
and 
 







We see then that

 


 
	 
	
	   
	
 
	 
	

 
	


 
	 
 
	 
	

 
	

Since

	

 
5
 
, this implies that





   



.

 


 
	 
 
	 
	

 
	



 
	

   	

 
	 
	



 
	

   	


	

Lemma 2.1.2 The mutual information between the random variable  and the ran-
dom bit
  (with   flfi        ) is bounded:
	




 




 

   fi



  .ffi  
 
	  .ffi  fi

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Proof.Using lemma 2.1.1 as a bound on  
  


with

	
   
 
, we can obtain
the bound on mutual information:
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	   
  


  
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	  .ffi 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Lemma 2.1.3 If a source   outputs quantum states   and   with probabilities  
and ff with    ff , then mutual information between this source and the output of
any measuring device

is bounded: 	 



 




 

   fi






	

 
Proof.The source sends two states,   and 

. Eve does some POVM[Per93] on them.
The probability that Eve gets outcome  for her measurement given an input  is:
 .ffi 



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

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


. This gives:
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Since  
	


is Hermitian, we can diagonalize it as  
 




 
. Taking this and
applying the facts that

 are positive semi-definite and  


 	
, we get:
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Corollary 2.1.1 If a source   outputs quantum states   and   , then mutual infor-
mation between this source and the output of any measuring device  is bounded:
	




 

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

 






	

 
Proof.Consider two cases, the first where   
ff
and the second where     . If

 
ff
, then using lemma 2.1.3 we have that 	




 




 

   fi






	

 
.
Since
   fi


 
, we get the result. If



 then relabel the 

as   and vice
versa. Hence in the original labeling, lemma 2.1.3 becomes
	




 




 

  
 




	



, and since
  flfi


 
we get the result.
19
2.2 Bound On Information For Any Source
In lemma 2.1.3, we derived a bound for the amount of mutual information about a
1 bit function that can be obtained by an arbitrary measurement based on the trace
norm of the density matrices. In this section, we extend our results to a source of any
number of outputs. As we will see later in the chapter, this allows us to derive the
fundamental information vs. disturbance results that are at work in quantum security
protocols. Additionally, this result gives an important insight into the robustness of the
trace norm as a metric bound for information.
This metric will be applied later in order to make a point about the great robustness
of quantum security protocols.
Lemma 2.2.1 For any random variable 
 	 with each probability  	    5   :


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



	

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 !
 
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
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Proof.
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
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
    
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

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, we see that
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
 
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
. See that
 
is concave and has a maximum at   5
 
and is zero at
   fi

 
;
thus, we can use the same type of lower bound as lemma 2.1.1:
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Plugging this into the definition of entropy:




 

 
  





 
  
	

	
 
  
	

 
	
  	  
	





 	

	7


 
 
	

  !	   	 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Lemma 2.2.2 For any source S that outputs  with probability   such that      5   ,
the mutual information is bounded:
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Proof.Make use of lemma 2.2.1:
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Lemma 2.2.3 If a source   outputs quantum states   with probabilities  with   
 
5
 
, then mutual information between this source and the output of any measuring
device

is bounded:
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Proof.Define the notation 
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. Starting from lemma 2.2.2, we use the defini-
tion of a POVM to replace
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
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Using the same facts about POVMs from the previous sections, one can show that
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Hence, we have:
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Corollary 2.2.1 If a source   outputs one of   quantum states   with probability   5   ,
then mutual information between this source and the output of any measuring device

is bounded: 	

 




  
 







	


.
Proof.For all   
 
, then   5  

 
5
 
, hence lemma 2.2.3 applies:
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2.3 Bounding the Trace Norm
As we have seen in the previous section, the trace norm distance between quantum
states is a powerful tool for bounding mutual information. Now we look at some
bounds on trace norm distances.
Lemma 2.3.1 The trace norm distance between two pure states is:
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Proof.Define 
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This is just a     matrix and we can compute the trace norm by taking the absolute
value of the eigenvalues, which are:
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Definition 2.3.1 Purification of  : any pure state    in        such that           

Lemma 2.3.3 The trace norm distance is reduced by partial trace:


	 	
 
	   

	
 

Where  and   are density matrices over states in      

and the partial trace is
over one of the subsystems:  	        and   	         .
Proof.See [Per93].
2.4 Security of Quantum Key Distribution
We now have the tools necessary in order to derive an information theoretic analogy
to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. This result is the basis for quantum security
results that we will examine in chapters 3 and 6.
Quantum key distribution is related to the problems we considered in the previous
section. Figure 2.1 gives a general attack that Eve might perform. From her perspec-
tive, she has access to a source (the system she has used to interact with the states sent
by Alice) and she can make any measurement to get information about what was sent.
The intuition about quantum mechanics is that measurements will disturb the system.
We will make this a precise statement about information and disturbance.
2.4.1 Security of Quantum Keys
Theorem 2.4.1 If Alice sends   -qubit states to Bob, each with equal probability, the
Information Eve can get about the state sent is bounded by the square root of the
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Figure 2.1: Most general attack by an eavesdropper
probability that the Eve would have caused errors in the Fourier transformed basis:
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Proof.We will use lemmas 2.3.3 and 2.3.2 and corollary 2.2.1. Starting from corollary
2.2.1 we see that: 	
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. Our approach will be to bound this by
introducing a purification1 for   (the state that Eve holds when Alice sends   ). Using
the purification and lemma 2.3.3 we can bound the original trace norm distance.
To attack the state sent to Bob, Eve attaches a probe in a fixed state (say the  fi 
state) and applies a unitary operator. She then passes Bob his part, and does some
generalized measurement on what she still holds. We can characterize this formally:
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We represent the Fourier transformed states as:
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Applying this to Eve’s attack, we obtain:
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8
see definition 2.3.1
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From the axioms of quantum mechanics, we know that if Alice sends
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ability that Bob will measure
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We are now prepared to compute the probability that there are no errors in Fourier-
transformed basis:
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For notational ease, we define a new variable
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; due to the delta function, all
the terms that do not also have
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are zero. We restrict our case to the zero
error probability:
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When Eve’s states are considered without Bob, her state will look like   
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Now we will define a purification for Eve’s states that will allow us to compute the
trace norm easily. Using the purification from [BBB99], we assume that Eve holds
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, which is a purification of her state 
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. We also define the
Fourier transform of these states:
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. The Fourier transform is
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unitary, so see that
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which we will make use in order to get a bound. We now calculate the norm of the
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Where we have re-labeled the states in the last step. In fact, 
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do not need this result. We are now ready to prove the theorem. Define 
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We will see that we may introduce an intermediate pure state to make the bounding of
the information easier. The pure state we will use is
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. Starting with corollary
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Putting this together:
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Where   is the probability that there is an error in the Fourier transformed basis,
which proves the theorem.
The previous theorem is what gives security to quantum key distribution schemes;
however, we have only shown that QKD schemes are secure if the errors caused in the
Fourier-transformed basis are extremely small. Ideally, we would like Eve’s informa-
tion to be exponentially close to zero. We consider in detail the case where there are
errors on the channel between Alice and Bob in chapter 3. We show that, as long as
the errors are not too large, they can all be corrected with Eve only gaining exponen-
tially little information. It is the result in chapter 3 that proves the security of realistic
quantum key distribution.
2.4.2 Security of Functions of Messages
According to theorem 2.4.1, if the fidelity Bob would have had in the Fourier trans-
formed basis is exponentially close to unity, then Eve’s information is exponentially
low. It does not address the question of what information Eve might get about a func-
tion of a message encrypted with that key. Suppose Eve only wants to know if the
message has a particular value. This function only has exponentially little information
about the message itself. Could Eve learn this information? The next theorem will
show that this, too, is impossible.
Theorem 2.4.2 If Alice sends the   qubit state    to Bob, with  chosen uniformly at
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random, and after Bob has received the state Alice announces       , then the
information Eve can get about any function of  ,     , is bounded by the square root
of the probability that the Eve would have caused errors in the Fourier transformed
basis:
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Proof.This proof will follow closely the proof of theorem 2.4.1 and use the same tools.
The state consistent with a function value   is:
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The definition of mutual information[CT91] means that:
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Using lemma 2.2.3
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In the last sum, we sum over all   with equal weight; hence, the
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dependence disap-
pears:
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Putting this back into the information bound:
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Which proves the result.
2.5 Summary
By developing bounds on entropy, we are able to apply these to bound the amount
of information that measurements can get from a quantum source. Modeling eaves-
dropping in quantum key distribution as a quantum source, we are able to bound in-
formation that an eavesdropper can get. Since this bound is a function of the errors
that would be caused in a Fourier transformed basis, Alice and Bob can use their mea-
surements to estimate this figure. Therefore, Alice and Bob can bound information
that Eve has about the information they share. In addition to showing security of such
information, we show for the first time that any function of messages encrypted with
this secret information is secure. This is a very strong statement about the robustness
of quantum security.
What lies next is to In the following chapter, we examine the case where there are
errors on the channel. We then show a similar but stronger result, namely that Eve must
cause more errors than Alice and Bob could have corrected in the Fourier transformed
32
basis.
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CHAPTER 3
Security of Quantum Key Distribution
3.1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution [BBB92, BB84] uses the power of quantum mechanics to
suggest the distribution of a key that is secure against an adversary with unlimited
computation power. Such a task is beyond the ability of classical information process-
ing. The extra power gained by the use of quantum bits (quantum two-level systems)
is due to the fact that the state of such a system cannot be cloned. On the other hand,
the security of conventional key distribution is based on the (unproven) existence of
various one-way functions, and mainly on the difficulty of factoring large numbers, a
problem which is assumed to be difficult for a classical computer, and is proven to be
easy for a hypothetical quantum computer [Sho97].
Various proofs of security were previously obtained against collective attacks [BM97b,
BM97a, BBB98], and we continue this line of research here to prove the ultimate se-
curity of quantum key distribution (QKD), against any attack (under the conventional
assumptions of theoretical QKD, as explained below). Note that the eavesdropper
is assumed to have unlimited technology (e.g., a quantum memory, a quantum com-
puter), while the legitimate users use practical tools (or more precisely, simplifications
of practical tools).
To prove security against such a super-strong eavesdropper we develop some im-
portant technical tools and we reach some surprising results: we obtain a new infor-
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mation versus disturbance result, where the power of quantum information theory is
manifested in an intuitive and clear way. We show explicitly how the randomness of
the choice of bases, and the randomness of the choice of test-bits provides the desired
security of QKD. We adopt and generalize sophisticated tools invented in [BBB98],
and developed more in chapter 2: a “purification” which simplifies Eve’s states; a
bound on accessible information (using Trace-Norm-Difference of density matrices)
which avoids any complicated optimization of Eve’s possible measurements; a con-
nection between Eve’s accessible information and the error-rate she induces. We add
some more simplifications (which were not required in the analysis of collective at-
tacks in [BBB98]): a reduction to a scheme in which all qubits are used by Alice and
Bob, and a usage of a symmetry of the problem under investigation.
Recently there have been a few security results announced [May96, May, LC99,
BBB99, Lo, SP00] 1. This proof differs from other proofs in that uses tools similar
to those in chapter 2 to find explicit bounds on information which are a function of
the errors that the eavesdropper would cause. Other proofs, specifically [LC99, Lo,
SP00], make use of an ingenious reduction to allow the proof of security in the case
of exponentially few errors, to apply to a case where an error correction code is used.
The current work may be elucidating to security proofs for protocols which might not
have such a mapping onto quantum error codes.
We follow the standard assumptions of QKD (assumption 3 is discussed in [BMS,
BLM00] in much details): 1) Alice and Bob share an unjammable classical channel.
This assumption is usually replaced by the demand that Alice and Bob share a short
secret key to be used for authenticating a standard classical channel (hence the protocol
is then a quantum key expansion protocol). 2) Eve cannot attack Alice’s and Bob’s
labs. She can only attack the quantum channel and listen to all transmissions on the
8
This chapter is a adaptation of [BBB99], of which I was a coauthor
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classical channel. 3) Alice sends quantum bits (two level systems).
We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard-84 (BB84) protocol [BB84], against
any attack allowed by the rules of quantum physics. We prove the security for instances
in which the error rate in the transmission from Alice to Bob is up to 7.56%.
3.1.1 The BB84 Protocol and the Used-Bits-BB84 Protocol
Quantum cryptography [Wie83, BB84] was described in several places, some of which
are also introducing the notations in a more expository way, and a reader who is un-
familiar with the basics of quantum information processing is referred for instance to
the Appendix in [BBC93b].
In the BB84 protocol Alice and Bob use four possible quantum states in two
bases (using “spin” notations, and connecting them to “computation basis” notations):
(i)  fi     fi  ; (ii)            ; (iii)  fi   



  fi

 
   
; and (iv)      



 fi

	 
   
. We shall refer to these states as the BB84 states. By comparing bases
after Alice transmit such a state and Bob receives it, a common key can be created in
instances when Alice and Bob used the same basis.
We prove here the security of a simplified protocol in which only the relevant
bits are discussed (we call it the “used-bits-BB84”). The proof of the security of the
original BB84 protocol follows immediately, due to a simple reduction, as we show in
section 3.6.
Let us describe the used-bits protocol in detail, splitting it into creating the sifted
key and creating the final key from the sifted key. This simplified protocol assumes that
Bob has a quantum memory.
I. Creating the sifted key:
1. Alice and Bob choose a large integer      . The protocol uses
 
  bits.
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2. Alice randomly selects two     -bit strings,   and   which are then used to create
qubits: The string   determines the basis
fi
 
, and  


of the qubits. The
string   determines the value (0 or 1) of each of the     qubits (in the appropriate
bases).
Alice generates
 
  qubits according to her selection, and sends them to Bob via
a quantum communication channel.
3. Bob tells Alice when he receives the qubits.
4. Alice publishes the bases she used,   ; this step should be performed only after
Bob received all the qubits.
Bob measures the qubits in Alice’s bases to obtain a
 
  -bit string

.
We shall refer to the resulting
 
  -bit string as the sifted key, and it would be the
same for Alice and Bob, i.e.     , if natural errors and eavesdropping did not
exist.
II. Creating the final key from the sifted key:
1. Alice chooses at random a     -bit string

which has exactly   zeroes and   ones.
There are 



such strings to choose from.
2. From the
 
  bits, Alice selects a subset of   bits, determined by the zeros in

,
to be the test bits. Alice publishes the values of these test bits (given by a string
 
 ). The values of Bob’s bits on the test bits are given by   .
The other   bits are the information bits (given by a string   ). They are used for
deriving a final key via error correction codes (ECC) and privacy amplification
(PA) techniques.
Alice shall send the ECC and PA information to Bob, hence Bob needs to correct
his errors and use PA to obtain a key equal to Alice’s.
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3. Bob verifies that the error rate 




 
 

 


5
  in the test bits is lower than
some agreed error-rate          , and aborts the protocol if the error rate is larger.
4. Bob also publishes the values of his test bits (  ). This is not crucial for the
protocol, but it is done to simplify the proof.
5. Alice selects a linear ECC with  

code words of   bits, and a minimal Hamming
distance   between any two words: an    


 

code, and publishes it along with
the ECC parities on the information bits. The strategy is that Alice announces
the parity check matrix of an ECC, i.e., 

 
	
parity check strings of n
bits:   ,
 
 

     

 . She then announces  bits which are the parities of
her string    with respect to the parity check matrix, which is 
 
   for all

.
Bob doesn’t announce anything. The condition on the ECC is that it corrects


 

   	  

 
  

  errors, for some positive

%
  
. If an ECC corrects has
 

 


  it will always correct

errors, and thus
 

  

   	   

 
  

 

  is
sufficient for all codes. For Random Linear Codes
 

 

   	   

 
  

 

  is
also sufficient as noted in [May].
6. Bob performs the correction on the information bits.
7. Alice selects a privacy amplification function (PA) and publishes it. The PA
strategy is to publish

  -bit strings and use the parities of the bits masked
by these strings as the secret key. That is she announces privacy-amplification-
strings 

, where
 


 

     


 
, of   bits each. The final secret key bits
are 

 
. This strategy is similar to error correction except that the parities are
kept secret.
The PA strings must be chosen such that the minimal distance  , between any
string in their span and any string in the span of their union with the ECC parity-
check-strings, is at least  
  

      
 




  . Note that, by definition, the
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minimal distance of the space spanned by the ECC and PA strings,    , is less
than the above distance, hence if we demand     
  

   	  
 
 


  , the above
criterion is automatically satisfied.
8. Bob performs the PA on the corrected information bits. The result obtained is
the final key.
3.1.2 Eavesdropping
Eve attacks the qubits in two steps. First she lets all qubits pass through a device that
tries to probe their state. Then, after receiving all the classical data, she measures the
probe. She can gain nothing by measuring the probe earlier, since such a measurement
is a special case of applying a unitary operation (it is the application of a measurement
gate). Thus we can split Eve’s attack into her transformation and her measurement.
Eve’s transformation: The qubits can be attacked by Eve while they are in the
channel between Alice and Bob. Eve can perform any attack allowed by the laws
of physics, the most general one being any unitary transformation on Alice’s
qubits and Eve’s probe. We are generous to Eve, allowing her to attack all the
bits together (in practice, she usually needs to send the preceding qubit toward
Bob before she has access to the next one).
Without loss of generality we assume that all the noise on the qubits, is caused
by Eve, and can be used by her in any way she likes.
Eve’s measurement: Eve keeps the probe in a quantum memory. After Eve
receives all the classical information from Alice and Bob, including the bases of
all bits, the choice of test bits, the test bits values, the ECC, the ECC parities, and
the PA, she tries to guess the final key using her best strategy of measurement.
39
Eve’s goal is to learn as much information as possible on the final key without
causing Alice and Bob to abort the protocol due to a failure of the test. The task of
finding Eve’s optimal operation in these two steps is very difficult. Luckily, to prove
security that task need not be solved, and it is enough to find bounds on Eve’s optimal
information (via any operation she could have done): In order to analyze her optimal
transformation we find bounds for any transformation she could perform, and in order
to analyze her optimal measurement we find bounds for any measurement she could
perform.
3.1.3 Security and Reliability
The issue of the security criterion is non-trivial since the obvious security criterion
(that Eve’s information given that the test passed, is small) does not work.
To be more precise, let
 
be a random variable presenting Alice’s final key,  be
a random variable presenting Bob’s final key, and  a random variable representing
a string in Eve’s hands as result of her measurements. Let  be a random variable
presenting if the test passed or failed. What one would like to obtain as a security
criterion is
	

 





	



 
ffi
 

with
 
and

(with any subscript)
positive constants.
Unfortunately the above bound is not satisfied in quantum cryptography. Given
that the test is passed, Eve can still have full information. Consider the swap attack:
Eve takes Alice’s qubits and puts them into a quantum memory. She sends random
BB84 states to Bob. Eve measures the qubits she kept after learning their bases, hence
gets full information on Alice’s final key. In this case, Bob will almost always abort
the protocol because it is very unlikely that his bits will pass the test. However, even
in the rare event when the test is passed, Eve still has full information on Alice’s key.
So, given the test is passed (a rare event), information is still  bits, and the above
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criterion cannot be satisfied.
Another potential security criterion says the following: “if Eve tries an attack that
gives her non-negligible information on a final key she has to be extremely lucky in
order to pass the test.” As observed in an earlier version of [May], this criterion is
also inappropriate. Consider the half-SWAP attack in which Eve does nothing with
probability half, and performs the SWAP attack with probability half. This half-SWAP
attack gives information of exactly m/2, and it passes the test with probability larger
than half. Obviously these two cases, getting a non-negligible information, and passing
the test with high probability, will not happen in the same event, hence this example
motivates a more precise definition of security (first used in [May]).
In order to prove security we show that the event where the test is passed and Eve
obtains meaningful information on the key is extremely unlikely.
Formally, the security criterion is:
 
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

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 (3.1)
where  is the test outcome and 	
- 


	

 




 


 


 


 is the information Eve has
on the key, after the particular protocol values (    ,   ,   ,  ) are announced by Alice and
Bob. The event in which the test is passed includes all the cases such that
 


 

 

satisfies
  

 
 


   	  
. Note that Alice and Bob can increase the number of bits  
as they like to increase security.
We show that the final

-bit key is reliable: the keys distiled by Alice and Bob are
identical except for some exponentially small probability
 
ffi
fiff


.
3.1.4 Structure of the Chapter
The rest of the paper contains three main steps: In Section 3.2 we reduce the prob-
lem to a simpler problem of optimizing over all attacks symmetric to the bit values 0
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and 1. In Section 3.3 we analyze the information bits in the bases actually used by
Alice and Bob, and we prove our main information versus disturbance theorem: the
eavesdropper information on the final key is bounded by the following probability: the
probability of error if the other bases were used by Alice and Bob (this probability is
well defined). We then obtain in Section 3.4 a bound on



 








 	


 


 


 



	 
 
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
and prove that this bound is exponentially small with   . This expression could also
serve as a security criterion, since it immediately follows (from this bound) that the
security criterion 3.1 is satisfied as shown in section 3.7.
Various technical details and Lemmas are proven in the appendices, so that the
proof can be read more smoothly.
3.2 Eve’s Attack
In the used-bits BB84 protocol Alice sends a string   encoded in the bases of her choice
  , and Bob measures a string

using the same set of bases. Eve prepares a probe in a
known state, say
 fi

. Eve applies a unitary transformation
	
on all the qubits and her
probe and then she sends the disturbed qubits to Bob, while leaving her probe in her
hands. The unitary transformation
	
is written in the basis   ,
	   fi


   





	




 

,
with


	




the unnormalized states of Eve’s probes if Alice sent

  
, and Bob received
 

.
Later on Eve obtains all classical information sent by Alice and Bob. Eve learns  
(the bases) and  (which bits are the test bits and which are the information bits). She
also learns the values of the test bits    and   . We also use    and   to denote the
values of the information bits. Then, Eve’s attack (written in a basis   chosen by Alice)
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looks like:
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Once the additional data regarding the bases and the values of the test bits is given to
Eve, this data modifies her probes’ states. We define 

 

to be the state of Eve+Bob if
Alice chose a bases   , a sample

, and values       , Eve’s attack is 	 , and Bob received

 in his measurement on the test bits. After renormalization Eve and Bob’s state is:
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Since 
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 
, using the above definitions the normalization is fixed2:     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For a given    and   , we define:
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Eve’s states for a given classical data regarding (            ). Then,
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We now present a symmetrized attack (which is symmetrical to Alice sending 0
or 1 for the bit values). This is required in order to obtain Eq.(3.11,3.12). Recall that
the choice of
fi
5
  is random. As a result, any attack chosen by Eve can be replaced
by an equivalent attack which is as good, with   replaced by  
 
and with

replaced
by
  
, for any

. Thus, any attack chosen by Eve can also be replaced by an
equivalent symmetric attack which is as good, in which

is chosen at random. The
symmetrization does not change the average induced error-rate. For an arbitrary attack,
the symmetrization can improve Eve’s final information on the common secret key (or
leave it the same). Thus, if the optimal attack is asymmetric, there is also an equivalent
	

is the usual probability theory notation: 

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symmetric attack which is as good, hence also optimal. Thus, the optimal attack can
be assumed to be symmetric, without loss of generality (WLG), and we therefore need
to bound Eve’s information only for attacks symmetric to 0/1.
The symmetrization is performed using bit-wise operations: Given any transforma-
tion of Eve, it is symmetrized as follows: For each qubit


 

sent by Alice, Eve adds a
qubit in a state
  
 

   fi





  fi  

 
 
 
%
, and performs a pseudo-controlled-NOT
transform on this bit as the control and




as the target: if
   

 fi
leave




as is;
otherwise negate it (i.e., rotate the spin by 180 degrees) in both  basis and  basis.
After the application of the (possibly asymmetric) attack 	 , Eve performs the inverse
of this pseudo-controlled-NOT transform, and let Alice’s qubit continue to Bob. The
gate which does the negation properly in both

and

bases is the Control-(        ) on
this ancillary qubit and the data qubit. For any attack
	
chosen by Eve, she applies the
symmetrization and the resulting attack is
	

 

. The 0/1 symmetrization ensures that
the errors are independent of the values 0 or 1 that Alice sends (in either basis). The
overall attack on all qubits is then described by 	

 
  fi

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which can be written using

	
as follows:
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If Eve measures
 

at any stage of the attack (and receives a specific value, say  ),
the resulting attack is one in which   and

of the original attack are replaced by  
 
and
  
as previously described, hence an attack which is equivalent to the original
attack.
To prove that the
fi
5
 
symmetrization does not change the average error-rate is
obvious since Eve can always project onto one particular  (and destroy the symmetry)
by measuring    , and any such projection leads to the same attack (up to a shift of
 
and  by  ). Since Eve can perform that measurement later on (when she does
not hold Bob’s qubits anymore), her measurement cannot affect Bob’s outcomes due
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to causality argument. It is also obvious that the symmetric attack cannot be worse
(for Eve) in terms of Eve’s information, since she can always measure  . Clearly,
the symmetrization can only increase Eve’s information since she does not have to
measure

but can also do other things.
The property of symmetric attacks that we are using is:
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More explicitly, we calculate:
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Hence,
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ability theory we then get
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. Thus, for any symmetrized attack
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because of independence:      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

 
   because Alice chooses   ,   and

independently of each other. In Subsections 3.3.3
and 3.3.4 we make use of this property      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3.3 Information vs. Disturbance
In this section we analyze the information bits alone (for a given symmetric attack
	

 

, a given input    and outcome   on the test bits, and given bases   and choice
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of test bits  ). Our result here applies for any 	

 

, hence in particular for the opti-
mal one. The optimization over Eve’s measurement is avoided by using the fact that
trace-norm of the difference of two density matrices provides an upper bound on the
accessible information one could obtain via any measurement when having the two
density matrices as the possible inputs.
3.3.1 Eve’s State
When Alice sends a state

    for the information bits (written in the basis actually
used by her and Bob for these bits), the state of Eve and Bob together,      

 


 

 

 
 is fully determined by Eve’s attack and by the data regarding the test
bits. Eve’s state in that case is fully determined by tracing-out Bob’s subsystem
 
 
from the Eve-Bob state, and it is

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 
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
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 
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 


calculated given    and


. This state in Eve’s hands is a mixed state.
3.3.2 Purification and a Related Basis
We can “purify” the state while giving more information to Eve by assuming she keeps
the state
 



  


 

  


  
 
 
where we introduce another subsystem for the “purification”. [Note that an index  	 
for
 
is not required since the purified state is only defined on the information bits].
The term purification means different things in different papers, thus we explain it a
bit more: a mixed state can also be obtained from a pure state in an enlarged system
(the original system plus an ancilla), once the ancilla is traced out; the pure state of
the enlarged system is called a purification of the mixed state. In a more general case,
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the state in the enlarged system is not necessarily pure, and then we refer to it as a
“lift-up” [BBB98] of the state of the original system.
The resulting purified state (i.e., any purification or any lift-up of Eve’s states) is at
least as informative to Eve as 
 
is. This is because the density matrix is exactly the
same as it was if Eve ignores the   
 

register of

. Thus, any information Eve can
obtain from her mixed state is bounded by the information she could get if the purified
state was available to her. Note that the overlap between these purified states satisfies
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For the space spanned by the purified states   , we define a basis     , and show that
it is possible to compute a bound on Eve’s information on the information bits, once
the purified states are expressed in this basis.
Definition 3.3.1
   


 
 


 
#	
 
 
 

 


  




      




      
5
  
Using the above definitions and

 
5
 
 

 
 	
 






 
  
, Eve’s purified state can be
rewritten as:
 

 
 
 	
 

 
  
 

 
 
#	
 

 
  

 
 
 (3.8)
Note that 
      






 


#	
 
 



 

 



, hence the length of the vectors
 
is the average over all

, of the Fourier transform of the overlap 

 

 



. In terms of
Eve’s states we get
 




      


 
 



 


#	
 






 


 







  (3.9)
47
3.3.3 Eve’s State and Probability of Errors Induced on Information Bits
In this subsection we show that the probability of any error string Eve would have
induced if the conjugate basis was used for the information bits, is a simple function
of
  
’s (of Definition 3.3.1), hence a function of the overlap.
First, we discuss the error rate in the basis        actually used by Alice and Bob.
For any attack
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For any symmetrized attack satisfying the 0/1 symmetry, the error distribution in the
information bits is
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the average probability of an error syndrome
 
for the information bits (when the test
bits, basis and sequence are given). The first equality is derived using standard proba-
bility theory and the second is due to Eq. (3.7) and Eq. (3.10).
Due to the linearity of quantum mechanics, given Eve’s attack in one basis we can
write Eve’s attack in any other basis, and in particular, in a basis
	
 


 

, where the

5

bases of each information qubit are interchanged. We refer to this basis as the
“conjugate basis”, but note that it is only conjugate on the information bits. For an
input string  

  

 
 in the conjugate basis ( 	       ) and an output string        ,
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the error distribution for the information bits is
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 (see section 3.8.1). The independence of
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 is used here exactly as in Eq. (3.11). The following
lemma shows that the probability of an error syndrome   (if the conjugate bases were
used) equals the coefficients    (calculated for the purifications in the basis actually in
use  
 ) when writing the purification of Eve’s states using the basis      .
Lemma 3.3.1
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Proof 3.3.1 See section 3.8.1.
3.3.4 Bounds on Eve’s Information
In this subsection we improve upon a result based on [BBB98]. Eve’s information on
a particular bit of the final key (even if all other bits of the final key are given to her) is
bounded. We take into consideration the error-correction data that is given to Eve, and
we do it more efficiently than in [BBB98], hence we obtain a much better threshold
for the allowed error-rate.
Let us first discuss one-bit final key, defined to be the parity of substring of the
input    . The substring is defined using a mask  , meaning that the secret key is     
(so  tells us the subset of bits whose parity is the final key). Bob first correct his
errors using the error correction code data, hence he learns the string    of Alice. Eve
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does not know    , but she learns the error correcting code   used by Alice and Bob
as well as  and the parity bits  sent by Alice to help Bob correct the sequence he
received. All the possible inputs    that have the correct parities  for the code   form
a set denoted   .
When the purification of Eve’s state is given by
 

the density matrix is 




  
. In order to guess the key  



 
, Eve must now distinguish between two
ensembles of states: the ensemble of [equally likely, due to Eq.(3.7)] states 

with
  
  and key  



  
 fi
, and the ensemble of (equally likely) states 

with
  
  and key  



  

 
. For    
fi

  	
these ensembles are represented by the
following density matrices:

 
 
 









 	

  
 
 



(the lift-ups of the states really known to Eve) and Eve’s goal is to distinguish be-
tween them. A good measure for their distinguishability is the optimal mutual in-
formation (known as the accessible information) that one could get if one needs to
guess the bit   by performing an optimal measurement to distinguish between  
and   when the two are given with equal probability (half). We call this Shan-
non Distinguishability (   ) to emphasize that it is a distinguishability measure, and
 

 

	

 
 



 





 


	
where the optimization (maximization) is over all
possible measurements.
In the same way that  acts as a mask and the secret bit is     , the error-correction
data also acts as masks: the  “parity-check strings” 





     


, and the parities:
 


  




  

     



   	
are given to Eve. Let us assume (WLG) that these parity-check
strings are linearly independent. Eve also knows the parity of any linear combination
of the  parity strings, e.g.,


 




  
. As result, a total of
 

parity strings and
parity bits are known to Eve. Let us take

to be an index running from
fi
to
 

	
 
, so
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we call the set of all these
 

parity strings
  
, and   
  
means that 
 is in this set.
Let

 be the minimum Hamming distance between  and any (error correction)
parity string 

. [The minimal Hamming weight of     when the minimum is over
all strings 


   ]. Then, for Eve’s purified states        #	  
 
 
 
 
  
 

, we obtain
that
Lemma 3.3.2 The Shannon distinguishability between the parity 0 and the parity 1 of
the information bits over any PA string,  , is bounded above by the following inequal-
ity:
 
 



 



 
 


 

 
 (3.14)
where  is any positive constant, and
 
 
is the optimal mutual information that Eve
can obtain regarding the parity bit defined by the string  (given the test and unused
bits).
The proof is given in section 3.9
This gives an upper bound for Eve’s information about the bit defined by this pri-
vacy amplification string  . In order to prove security in case of
 bits in the final
key, we start by proving security of each bit when we assume that Eve is given the
ECC information and in addition, she is also given the values of all the other bits of
the key. This is like using a code with 
  	
  independent parity check strings,
or like using less code words. Since  does not appear in the above bound, replac-
ing  by 
  	
  leaves the same result as before,
 
 







 
 


 

  , as a
bound on Eve’s information on (any) one bit of the final key Although looks identical
to Eq.(3.14), there is a difference between the two bounds since the additional parity
strings of the privacy amplification causes a decrease in  , which is now the minimal
Hamming distance between a particular parity string of the privacy amplification, and
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any parity string of the error correction together with the other privacy amplification
strings (and their linear superpositions).
3.3.5 Eve’s Information versus the Induced Disturbance
We have already shown in Eq.(3.13) that             	            


 
. Thus,
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This equation bounds the information of Eve using the probability of the error syn-
dromes in the other basis, and it completes the “information versus disturbance” result
of our proof. Previous security proofs (for simpler attacks), such as [FGG97, BM97a,
BBB98] are also based on various “information versus disturbance” arguments, since
the non-classicality of QKD is manifested via such arguments.
The result is expressed using classical terms: Eve’s information is bounded using
the probability of error strings with large Hamming weight. If only error strings with
low weight have non-zero probability, Eve’s information becomes zero. Such a result
is a “low weight” property and it resembles a similar result with this name which was
derived by Yao [Yao95] for the security analysis of quantum oblivious transfer. Hence-
forth we no longer concern ourselves with the delicate issues of quantum mechanics.
From this point on we want to use standard information theory and probability no-
tations. Shannon Distinguishability is the optimal mutual information between Eve’s
bits (  ) and Alice’s 

bit (    ) (when all other PA bits are given together with the ECC
data and test data). Therefore, 	     
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.
When summing over the

bits of the key, the total information Eve receives on
the final

-bit key is bounded by
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as proven in section 3.10
If 

 
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however, to derive the security criterion we need not fix  yet.
3.4 Completing the Security Proof
In this section we analyze the attack on the test and information together (3.2). For
these states, we bound a weighted average of Eve’s information:
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We show that the above bound is small and then we show that security is achieved.
Note that
 
 replaces

 from this point forward (when    is given). Recall that    
 

 

, so once
 
 is known

 is uniquely given.
3.4.1 Exponentially Small Bound on Eve’s Information
We generalize here previous proofs [BMS96, BM97b, BBB98] that information on
parity bits is exponentially small, to be applicable for the joint attack.
The maximum error rate that still passes the test is


   	   (or   ). Also recall that
 denotes the random variable for the test. Making use of Eq. 3.16 we get:
Lemma 3.4.1



 




 	


 


 


 



	

 




 


 


 



  


 


  





 


  


 
 



	
 


 



53
Proof 3.4.1 See appendix 3.8.2.
For an

 (called earlier 
   ) such that          
  we get the following bound:
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Thus far, there is nothing that causes the bound on the right hand side to be a small
number. The result above is true even if Eve is told in advance the bases of Alice and
Bob (the string   ), or if she is told in advance which are the test bits and which are the
used bits (the string  ), two cases in which Eve easily obtains full information.
Only Eve’s lack of knowledge regarding the random   and

provides an exponen-
tially small number at the right hand side. Since Eve must fix her attack before she
knows the basis or order, we compute the average information for a fixed attack over
all bases and orders. Averaging over   means that we sum over all   ’s and multiply each
term by the constant 

 


 
5
 


. The averaging over   removes the dependence on
the particular basis:
Lemma 3.4.2
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Proof 3.4.2 Summing over   i.e.        is the same as summing over
	
 


 

.
By averaging over all values of the sample strings

and basis choices   ,
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Lemma 3.4.3



 








 	


 


 


 



	 
 




 


 


 



  


 


  
  


 



 

 

  


 
 




Proof 3.4.3 This follows from the definition of the probability of an event: it is calcu-
lated by averaging over all values of   and  .
By assigning a value to the free parameter  we get:
Lemma 3.4.4
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The current bound can be dealt with the help of a random sampling theorem (Ho-
effding’s law of large numbers [Hoe63]). For a long string, the test bits and the infor-
mation bits should have similar number of errors if the test is picked at random. The
probability that they have different numbers of errors should go to zero exponentially
fast as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4.5 For any 
  fi ,       
   ffi  &



.
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Proof 3.4.5 See section 3.8.3.
As a Corollary we get
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and the above bound we obtain the security cri-
terion:
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. The above follows from standard
probability and information theory as shown in section 3.7.
Note that Lemma 3.4.5 also provides the proof that once the test passes there are no
more than
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  errors in the information string (except for exponentially small
probability ffi  &
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, in the reliability criterion.
The above bound of Eve’s information is exponentially small, but it assumes that
we have a desired ECC. If we restrict ourselves to linear codes, then the properties
required of the ECC are: (1) It can correct all the errors (except for exponentially small
probability
ffi

&



fiff
 ; see Lemma 3.4.5) in the information string, and (2) The minimum
distance of the code words in the span of the dual code and the PA strings (hence,
the augmented dual code is of dimension 
  ) should have a minimum distance of
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
. In fact, it can be shown that for random linear codes (RLC’s),
requirement (1) can be satisfied with only an exponentially small probability of error
if the minimum distance is   
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
      
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
. We show in section 3.11 that the two
above-mentioned requirements can be satisfied and one can generate an

-bit secret
56
key, if one picks an
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

      
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satisfies the bound and hence this is our threshold.
3.5 Summary
We proved the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) protocol for quantum key dis-
tribution. Our proof is based on a novel information-versus-disturbance result, on the
optimality of symmetric attacks, on laws of large numbers, and on various techniques
that simplifies the analysis of the problem.
3.6 Security of BB84
In the paper we prove that used-bits-BB84 is secure. Let us now present the original
BB84 protocol and prove, by reduction, that its security follows immediately from the
security of the used-bits-BB84 protocol.
The differences between the protocols are only in the first part:
I. Creating the sifted key:
1. Alice and Bob choose a large integer      , and a number

 
, such that
 


 

 
5

  
 

. The protocol uses   	 	
    
 

  bits.
2. Alice randomly selects two   	 	 -bit strings,   and   , which are then used to create
qubits: The string   determines the basis
fi
  , and   

of the qubits. The
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string   determines the value (0 or 1) of each of the   	 	 qubits (in the appropriate
bases).
3. Bob randomly selects an   	 	 -bit string,   	 , which determines Bob’s later choice
of bases for measuring each of the   	 	 qubits.
4. Alice generates   	 	 qubits according to her selection of   and   , and sends them
to Bob via a quantum communication channel.
5. After receiving the qubits, Bob measures in the basis determined by   	 .
6. Alice and Bob publish the bases they used; this step should be performed only
after Bob received all the qubits.
7. All qubits with different bases are discarded by Alice and Bob. Thus, Alice and
Bob finally have   	    	 	 5
 
bits for which they used the same bases. The   	 -
bit string would be identical for Alice and Bob if Eve and natural noise do not
interfere.
8. Alice selects the first
 
  bits from the   	 -bit string, and the rest of the   	 bits are
discarded. If   	  
 
  the protocol is aborted.
We shall refer to the resulting
 
  -bit string as the sifted key.
The second part of the protocol is identical to the second part of the used-bits-BB84
protocol. To prove that BB84 is secure let us modify BB84 by a few steps in a way
that each step can only be helpful to Eve, and the final protocol is the used-bits-BB84.
Recall that Alice and Bob choose their strings of basis   and   	 in advance. Recall
the the two strings are random. Thus, the first modification below has no influence
at all on the security or the analysis of the BB84 protocol. Note that after the first
modification Alice knows the un-used bits in advance. The second modification is
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done in a way that Eve can only gain, hence security of the resulting protocol provides
the security of BB84. The third modification is only “cosmetic”, in order to derive
precisely the used-bits-BB84 protocol. This modification changes nothing in terms of
Eve’s ability.
  Let Bob have a quantum memory. Let Alice choose   	 instead of Bob at step 3.
When Bob receives the qubits at step 5, let him keep the qubits in a memory,
and tell Alice he received them. In step 6, let Alice announce   	 to Bob, and Bob
measure in bases   	 .
Bob immediately knows which are the used and the un-used bits (as follows
directly from announcing   and   	 ). Steps 7 and 8 are now combined since Alice
and Bob know all the un-used bits already, and they ignore them, to be left with
 
  bits.
  Let Alice generate and send to Bob only the used bits in step 4, and let her ask
Eve to send the un-used bits (by telling her which these are, and also the prepa-
ration data for the relevant subsets, that is—          and            ). Knowing
which are the used bits, and knowing their bases           and values           
can only help Eve in designing her attack 	 	 .
Since Bob never uses the values of the unused bits in the protocol (he only ig-
nores them), he doesn’t care if Eve doesn’t provide him these bits or provide
them to him without following Alice’s preparation request.
After Bob receives the used and unused bits, let him give Eve the unused qubits
(without measuring them), and ask her to measure them in bases   	
 


 

 . Hav-
ing these qubits can only help Eve in designing her optimal final measurement.
Since Bob never use the values of the unused bits in the rest of the protocol, he
doesn’t care if Eve doesn’t provide him these values correctly or at all.
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  Since Alice and Bob never made any use of the unused bits, Eve could have
them as part of her ancilla to start with, and Alice could just create     bits, send
them to Bob, and then tell him the bases.
The protocol obtained after this reduction, is a protocol in which Eve has full
control on her qubits and on the unused qubits. Alice and Bob have control on
the preparation and measurement of the used bits only. This is the used-bits
BB84, for which we prove security in the text.
One important remark is that the exponentially small probability that   	  
 
  in
Step 8 (so that the protocol is aborted due to insufficient number of bits in the sifted
key) now becomes a probability that the reduction fails.
Another important remark is that the issue of high loss rate of qubits (e.g., due to
losses in transmission or detection) can also be handled via the same reduction. Thus,
our proof applies also to a more practical BB84 protocol where high losses are allowed.
By the way, another practical aspect is imperfect sources (in which the created
states are not described by a two-level system). This subject is the issue of recent
subtlety regarding the security of practical schemes [BMS, BLM00], and it is not dis-
cussed in this current work.
3.7 Satisfying the Security Criterion
So far we have not shown that the security criterion is satisfied by bounding the fol-
lowing:
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We now show that when the above bound is satisfied, as shown in the paper, then the
security criterion is satisfied:
 
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.
To show the above break the sum into the parts where Eve has large information
and the part where she has small. Then standard bounding techniques are used:
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The above steps follow from non-negativity of probability and mutual information. We
are really already done:
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So far 	 	 is a free parameter. We can set it to any value we like, namely
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Thus, the bounds that we have shown satisfy the security criterion.
3.8 A Few Technical Lemmas
3.8.1 A Proof of Lemma 3.3.1
From now on we assume the attack 0/1 symmetric (obtained by 0/1 symmetrization)
and consider only the information bits; we consequently drop the superscript
 
 
and
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. Those terms depend on               and
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where    fixes the bases on the information bits and    those on test bits. Had we
expanded according the conjugate basis    on information bits (    unchanged) namely
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where the last equalities are due to the calculation of the norm of
 
in Eq. (3.9).
3.8.2 A Proof of Lemma 3.4.1
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Now we show that 
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parameters independently, the sums over    and

 give delta functions (removing one
factor of   5
 

 ) and leave you with:


 





	
 


 





 
 




  






  








  






 





 


 




Using the above: 
  


 





	
 


 






 





 





  


 





	
 


 






 





	
 


 






  


 





	
 


 




and the terms inside brackets sum up to


 
  





 


 
  


 
 

 
	
 


 




64
which proves the lemma.
3.8.3 A Proof of Lemma 3.4.5
Let
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 is the probability that the information bits have 
 more than the allowed
error rate, when the test bits have less than the allowed error rate averaged over all
choices of test and information bits, for a particular basis   , and is given by
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is over all possible error strings on all bits, test and information. Note that in
principle 
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, can be calculated but we shall soon see that there is no need for it.
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does not depend on the attack. And in fact, in the aforementioned expression, the
basis   is superfluous. Once the error string
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is fixed, the values


 


and





depend
uniquely on the random string  . In fact
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Hoeffding [Hoe63] we know that
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Replacing   by its value in (3.21) and simplifying, equation (3.21) becomes
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3.9 Eve’s Information Versus the disturbance
In this appendix we do not prove Lemma 3.3.2 immediately. We prove it later on, in the
second subsection (the tight bound). For simplicity of the presentation, we first prove
another Lemma which leads to a loose bound (with an additional factor of  

), for
which the derivation is simpler. The bulk of the loose bound was derived in [BBB98],
and the tight bound is an improvement over that derivation. The loose bound lead to
a much worse threshold for


   	   (less than 1%, instead of 7.56% derived from the
tight bound), and this is the motivation for deriving the tight bound. One can skip
directly to the second subsection if desired.
Both the loose and the tight bound are derived using the fact that the Shannon
distinguishability between the parity 0 density matrix,   , and the parity 1 density
matrix, 

, is bounded by the trace norm of  
	


, and using the fact that the one can
easily calculate this trace-norm when the purified states are given by Eq. 3.8.
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3.9.1 The Loose Bound (BBBGM)
We have already defined a purification of Eve’s state:     
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Recall that the final key is computed as      . Eve does not know    , but she knows
from the announced syndrome that    is in the coset   for   

 

 
. Hence, in order
to know the key, Eve must distinguish between the states      
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 
that satisfy both the condition of being a code word, and the
condition of leading to the particular parity   for the PA.
Lemma. Let   be any linear code in 
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Lemma The Shannon distinguishability between the parity 0 and the parity 1 of the
information bits over any PA string,  , is bounded above by the following inequality:
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where
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, and  is any positive
constant.
Proof.— The Shannon distinguishability between the parity 0 and the parity 1 is
bounded by the trace norm of  
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 ([BBB98, FG99]). Let us calculate the required
bound:
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From equation (3.24) we know the sum over   is zero except when    	            ,
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The trace norm of this matrix serves as a bound on the information Eve receives.
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Using the above and making use of the triangle inequality for the Trace norm, the
following is obtained:
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where the last three steps are true for any real  , and real
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.
Due to the fact that the
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  form a probability distribution, any sum of them is less
than or equal to unity.
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now leaves:
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QED
The BBBGM result gives an upper bound for Eve’s information about the bit de-
fined by this privacy amplification string  . To prove security in case of

bits in the
final key, we prove security of each bit as follows: for each bit in the key we assume
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that Eve is given the ECC information and in addition, she is also given all the other
bits in the key. This is like using a code with more parity check strings  





(or less
code words), hence the previous result holds with
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Following the proof of the above Lemma, one can see that it is not a tight bound
since we sum over
 

terms while most of them are much smaller than the term (terms)
with the minimal

 .
3.9.2 Eve’s Information on One Bit – Tight Bound
We now show an improved technique, by defining a basis for the purification of the
code words (instead of a basis for all the purification).
We will now make a finer analysis of Eve’s state after she learns the parity matrix
and the syndrome 



 

 
. We start again from the equality:
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First, any



fi

  	
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  with
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and   
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.
Next, for any      we have   

 

  
for some
 

  and thus for any   
  
we
get   

 
 
 

 


 

 


  [because            ]. Putting those two remarks
together we get:
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 ’s are orthogonal. If
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Recall that the final key is computed as  
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. Of course, Eve does not know    , but
she knows from the announced syndrome 
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Lemma 3.9.1 3.3.2 The Shannon distinguishability between the parity 0 and the parity
1 of the information bits over any PA string,  , is bounded above by the following
inequality:
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 
 (3.30)
where  is the minimum weight of 


 for any 


  
, and  is any positive
constant.
Proof: The Shannon distinguishability between the parity 0 and the parity 1 is bounded
by the trace norm of  
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Applying equality (3.24) the sum indexed by   is zero except when    	   
 
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As usual, the trace norm of this matrix serves as a bound on the information Eve
receives. It is
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First note that  is in
 

 
and
 

  is closed under addition. Further the set
 

  is the
same as 
  
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 
. Then the set defined by  
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  is identical to the set    
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 
. We
will use this identity to obtain the following inequality:
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Now we wish to give a bound in terms of the original   ’s. Let us define
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, contradicts the
definition of  .
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We now use the claim to break up the sum bounding
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and prove the lemma.
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Due to the fact that the
 

  form a probability distribution, any sum of them is less than
or equal to unity.
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QED
Note that the number of parity check strings  doesn’t appear in the final expres-
sion, and this might seem surprising. However, it does appear there implicitly, since
increasing  by one increases the number of parity check strings from
 

	
 
to
 



	
 
,
hence potentially decreases  .
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3.10 Security of the Entire Key
We give a proof that bit-wise security implies security of the entire string. This is first
shown classically, and then making use of Shannon Distinguishability, the same bound
holds for quantum bits.
3.10.1 Classical Information Theory
Lemma 3.10.1 For independent random variables
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Due to the independence of
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QED
Theorem 3.10.1 For independent random variables
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Proof: Here we simply apply the chain rule for mutual information[CT91] and we then
apply the above lemma. We will use the same notions introduced in the previous proof.
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Lemma 3.10.2 For independent random variables
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outcomes for all   except   .
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Proof: We must simply prove 	
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apply the previous theorem.
	 
 
 



  
 


 
  




  
 
 
 
 
 


	 
 
 



  
 
 
 
 
 


 
  




  
 
 
 
 
 



 



 


	 
 
 



  
 
 
 
	
 
 


 
 

  


	 
 
 



  
 
 
 
 
 


QED
3.10.2 Quantum Connection
We have used classical information theory to prove the above identities. In the quantum
setting, Eve has a quantum system that may depend on Alice’s bits,
 

. The classical
formulas are all valid once a particular measurement on the system (POVM) is fixed
by Eve, so that:
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where 

is the random variable obtained by Eve’s output from her measurement  .
In particular the above is true for any measurement,

 , that Eve may consider optimal
to learn the bits of Alice’s key,
 

, all at once.
Now we need the definition of Shannon Distinguishability:
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Note, a measurement that achieves (or nearly achieves) this upper bound may not be
optimal for eavesdropping on the entire key, but that is of no consequence to the proof.
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Hence we have a bound for total mutual information for any measurement Eve might
consider optimal:
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3.11 Existence of Codes for Both Reliability and Security
Choosing a code which is good when   is large (for constant error rate) is not a trivial
problem in ECC. A Random Linear Code (RLC) is one such code, however, it does not
promise us that the distances are as required, but only gives the desired distances with
probability as close to one as we want. With RLC, we find that the threshold below
which a secure key can be obtained is


   	   


   
 .
In order to correct

errors with certainty, a code must have a minimal Hamming
distance between the code words
 

 


 
so that all original code words, even when
distorted by

errors, can still be identified correctly. For any    which passes the
test, we are promised (due to Lemma 3.4.5) that the probability of having   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Thus, we need to choose a RLC that promises a Hamming distance at least   such
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probability smaller than  
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For any    

 
	 
, and for  such that 
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  , an arbitrary random linear
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, except for a probability (see [Gal63], Theorem 2.2)
Prob    5    



   



 
 





 



0


  (3.36)
where
   






 
 


 

	
 
.
If we choose
   

   	   
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  


 
5
  then we are promised that the errors are
corrected, except for probability that the error rate is larger than expected or a bad code
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was chosen.
Using such a code,
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
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and almost all such codes correct all the errors.
Therefore, the code is reliable except for a probability    

.
The above result can be improved [May] by taking RLC with distance   	   
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and it is exponentially small (in the limit of large   ) for any        	    .
Recall that we choose
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. Let
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be the minimal
distance between one PA string and any other parity check string (or linear combina-
tion) taken from ECC and PA. Clearly, the Hamming weight of the dual code of the
ECC, once the PA is also added, provides a lower bound on
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. Thus, it is sufficient
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 in order to prove security. Choosing a RLC for
the ECC and PA, one cannot be completely sure that the distance indeed satisfies the
constraint, but this shall be true with probability exponentially close to one. We use
the dual code
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Assuming that Eve gets full information when the code fails we get:
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Since the first term is exponentially small we only need look at


. We also need to
worry about the reliability so we need  and
  
to be exponentially small as well. All
of them are exponentially small if the following conditions are met:
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Asymptotically, any


 



   
	


   


	


 

 is secure and reliable for
the given ECC+PA. Note, as

 goes to zero,


 



goes to   , which means all the
information bits are secret.
This threshold is based on the property of the code, and other codes might give
worse thresholds. It is possible to replace the RLC by a code that can be decoded
and encoded efficiently (e.g., Reed-Solomon concatenated code), and add random PA
strings. The Hamming distance between the PA check-strings and the ECC check-
strings is still bounded below in the same way as for the RLC (see [May]).
A better threshold can be obtained by using privacy-distillation instead of the stan-
dard ECC+PA approach.
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Note that any probability of failure in the classical transmission can be added in the
same way that


is added. This is important to prove security in the case where a fault-
tolerant classical transmission is not 100% reliable. It shows an important advantage
over the proof of [LC99] which is based on fault tolerant quantum ECC.
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CHAPTER 4
Encryption of Quantum States
4.1 Introduction
In chapter 3 we saw how by using quantum states, or specifically qubits, two parties
could share a key with perfect security. In this chapter we will consider how two par-
ties could send quantum states with perfect security. The question we ask is: how
many classically secure key bits do Alice and Bob need in order to encrypt a quantum
bit with perfect security, and what operations will they perform? We consider infor-
mationally secure encryption protocols, where any potential eavesdropper, Eve, will
have no information about the original quantum state, even if she manages to steal or
intercept the entire encrypted quantum data. This scenario is very different from the
well-known scheme of quantum cryptography, which in the usual sense[BB84, Ben92]
is really a secure expansion of an existing classical key, using a quantum channel and a
pre-selected set of quantum states. The resulting secure bits might then be used for an
encryption algorithm on classical data. For the tasks targeted in this chapter, we need
a method to make sure that even if the eavesdropper takes the quantum data, she will
still learn nothing about the quantum information. In this case, the eavesdropper may
not care about passing any tests, and may remove the qubits and replace them with
qubits in any state.
We provide a simple method to get informationally secure encryption of any quan-
tum state using a classical secret key. This could have several interesting applications.
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For example, if we imagine a scenario where good quantum memories are expensive,
one might rent quantum storage. Security in such a public-storage model would be
a high priority. We assume the user cannot store quantum data herself, but can store
classical data. Methods of using trusted centers for quantum cryptography have been
developed[BHM96]. Our method would allow a user to encrypt her quantum data us-
ing a classical key and allow a potentially malicious center to store the data, and yet she
would know that the center could learn nothing about her stored quantum data. Addi-
tionally, the untrusted center could act as a quantum communication provider. Several
other applications which involve adaptations of classical cryptographic protocols, such
as quantum secret sharing using classical key, are outlined later in the chapter.
4.2 Encryption of Quantum Data
Alice has a quantum state that she intends either to send to Bob, or to store in a quantum
memory for later use. Eve may intercept the state during transmission or may access
the quantum memory. Alice wants to make sure that even if Eve receives the entire
state, she learns nothing. Toward this end, any encryption algorithm must be a unitary
operation, or more specifically a set of unitary operations which may be chosen with
some distribution. It must be unitary because one must be able to undo the encryption,
and any quantum operation that is reversible is unitary[Pre].
The most general scheme is to have a set of  operations, 
	

	
,
 
 

     

 ,
where each element
	
 is a
 

  

unitary matrix. This set of unitary operations is
assumed to be known to all, but the classical key,

, which specifies the
	
 that is
applied to the   -bit quantum state, is secret. The key is chosen with some probability

 and the input quantum state is encrypted by applying the corresponding unitary
operation
	

. In the decryption stage, 	

 is applied to the quantum state to retrieve the
original state.
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The input state,  , is called the message state, and the output state,   , is called the
cipher-state. The protocol is secure if for every input state,  , the output state,   , is
the totally mixed state:


 

  

	


	



 
 

	
  (4.1)
The reason that   must be the totally mixed state is two fold. First, for security
all inputs must be mapped to the same output density matrix (because   must be
independent of the input). Second, the output must be the totally mixed state because
the totally mixed state is clearly mapped to itself by all encryption sets.
To see that this is secure, we note that Eve could prepare an n-bit totally mixed
state on her own. Since two processes that output the same density matrices are
indistinguishable[Per93], anything that can be learned from   can also be learned
from the totally mixed state.
The design criterion is to find such a distribution of unitary operations     	  	
that will map all inputs to the totally mixed state. A construction of such a map is
given next.
4.3 A Quantum One Time Pad
The algorithm is simple: for each qubit, Alice and Bob share two random secret bits.
We assume these bits are shared in advance. If the first bit is
fi
she does nothing, else
she applies  
 
to the qubit. If the second bit is fi she does nothing, else she applies    .
Now she sends the qubit to Bob. She continues this protocol for the rest of the bits.
We now show that this quantum one time pad protocol is secure. First note that this
bit-wise protocol can be expressed in terms of our general quantum encryption setup
by choosing



 
5
 


and
	

 


2
 (  



fi

  	  ), where 
  

 

 

 




 and
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2


 

 

 




 
. Thus



corresponds to applying    to the bits in positions given by
the   -bit string  , and similarly for 2  . Next, define the inner product of two matrices,


and 

, as









. If the set of all
 

  

matrices is seen as an inner
product space (with respect to the preceding inner product), then one can easily verify
that the set of
 


unitary matrices 



2

	 forms an orthonormal basis. Expanding
any message state,  , in this



2
 basis gives:

 
 

 
 




2

 (4.2)
where     





2





5
 

. Using this formalism, it is clear that the given choice
of

 and 	  satisfies eqn. (4.1), and hence the underlying protocol is secure:


  

	


	



 
 


 

 


 
2
 

2
 


 

 
 



 

 
 


 

 


 
2
 



2

2
 


 

 
 



 

 
 


 

 
 	
 


 

 





2

 
 

 
 


 








2


  


	






 

	

 
 

	 (4.3)
4.4 An Equivalent Problem
Since there are a continuum of valid density matrices, the quantum security criterion
(4.1) can be unwieldy to deal with. Here we introduce a modified condition that is
necessary and sufficient for security.
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Lemma 4.4.1 An encryption set 



	

	
satisfies eqn. (4.1) if and only if it satisfies:



 

  

	




2

	


 
 





	
  (4.4)
Proof: To show that the above condition is sufficient, express  in the 
  2  basis,
as was done in eqn. (4.3) and apply the eqn. (4.4).



 

  

	


	






 

  

	

 

 

 
 




2

 	


 
 

 
 




 

  

	




2

	




 

 
 


 





	

  


	






 

	

 
 

	
To show that the modified condition eqn. (4.4), is necessary is somewhat more
involved. First let us introduce some new notations:

 
	

 

  and  



	
 
 
The proof may be obtained by induction. Suppose all



with


  
are mapped to
zero by the encryption process. Now consider the following product state of  
	  	
 
mixed states, with exactly
 
  pure states   :












     












     



By expanding the above becomes:


	
 


 
 


(




 





 
 




( 
&


In the above we use decimal numbers where before we defined 
  with  in binary;
hence



 

 
  

1
. When the above  is encrypted we know that


 is mapped
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to itself. By assumption



with


  
is mapped to zero, hence the sum in the
expansion of  disappears. Since  must be mapped to

 
, then the last term in the
above, which is



with


   
 
, must be mapped to zero. By permuting the
initial input states, all



with


   
 
must be mapped to zero. The case where
 
  is our base case. By induction all



are mapped to zero.
If

is replaced by  in the above, then all 2  are mapped to zero also. If

is
replaced by

and using the fact that all



and 2  are mapped to zero, one sees that
all



2

are mapped to zero, which proves the lemma.
Thus, by using a basis for the set of
 

  

matrices, the condition for security
becomes discrete, and only  


equations need to be satisfied by the set 



	

	
. The
above lemma will be useful for showing necessary conditions on encryption sets.
4.5 Characterization and Optimality of Quantum One-Time Pads
So far, we have provided one quantum encryption protocol based on bit-wise Pauli
rotations, which uses
 
  random classical bits in order to encrypt   quantum bits.
In this section we explore the following questions: (1) What are some of the other
choices of 



	

	
that can be used to perform quantum encryption? In general, can
one precisely characterize all possible valid choices of 



	

	 ? and (2) Is the simple
quantum one time pad protocol optimal? That is, can one encrypt   -bit quantum states
using less than
 
  random secret classical bits? First, we prove a sufficient condition
for choosing a secure encryption protocol, and then provide a corresponding necessary
condition as well. In particular, we show that one cannot perform secure encryption of
  -bit quantum states using less than
 
  random classical bits.
Lemma 4.5.1 Any unitary orthonormal basis for the
 

  

matrices uniformly ap-
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plied encrypts   quantum bits.
Proof: We can always write the matrices,
	

, in terms of the



2
 basis as
	

 
 



 




2

  (4.5)
Since these
	

’s form an orthonormal basis, the  


  


transformation matrix  ,
comprising of the transformation coefficients, is a unitary matrix. Hence, the rows and
columns of  are orthonormal:



 



 




 

 


 
 
 



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 



 



 
 



 

  
  (4.6)
By substitution of
	
 in (4.1) the lemma is obtained:
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Lemma 4.5.2 Given any quantum encryption set, 



	

	
,
 
 

  

 , (i.e., 




 
,
	
 is unitary, and eqns. (4.1) and (4.4) are satisfied), let

	






	



 




 




2


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and let

 be the 
  


transformation matrix, comprising of the transformation co-
efficients



 

. Then  
 


, and






 
 


	
 
 
 
 
Proof: 



	

	
satisfies eqns. (4.1) and (4.4). Hence, for every      fi    	  ,
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Using the linear independence of the 
  2  , only the identity component is non-zero.
Hence security implies:
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As it will be evident, the second step in the above equation will be used to introduce a
linear algebra formulation of the problem. Now, let


 




 

 





 




 





 

 



which is the standard inner product of the   



and the    

columns of

 or
 







 




 

 

, and let
M






 



 


 

 

 #	
 
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 
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Eqn. (4.7) can now be written as a set of      linear equations:         fi    fi   ,
where  is the
 
 


 
vector consisting of all the possible inner products of pairs of
columns of

 , and M is a
 
 

  
 

matrix with elements from the set   
fi

	
 
. Next
we observe that a matrix A is orthogonal if and only if  
 



 

 
 
 





 , where
 

is the norm of the  

row (which must be greater than zero). One can easily verify
that M is an orthogonal matrix:
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In showing the above we have also found the inverse of M. The orthonormality of M
means that MM

  


	
, and hence M 


M

5
 


. Therefore, 
 M




  






,
which means  is the first row of M renormalized:
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Since 	


 


is a full rank matrix, then

 must have at least as many rows as columns.

 has
 


columns so  
 


.
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Theorem 4.5.3 Any given quantum encryption set,     	  	 ,           , (i.e., 




 
,
	
 is unitary, and eqns. (4.1) and (4.4) are satisfied) has:
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Hence, one must use at least
 
  random classical bits for any quantum encryption.
Additionally, if 
  


, then




 
and
	

’s form an orthonormal basis. Hence,
a set 



	

	 involving only
 
  secret classical bits is a quantum encryption set if and
only if the unitary matrix elements form an orthonormal basis, and they are all equally
likely.
Proof: By Lemma 4.5.2 we have that
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Using a singular value decomposition[GL89] of

 , we have the following relation-
ships:
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where
 
and

are 

 and
 


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

unitary matrices, respectively, and

is
an 
  

 diagonal rectangular matrix:               .Note that    and   are
real diagonal matrices and have the same non-zero elements; hence,




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

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
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repeated eigenvalues ( 
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
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and hence,
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The above uses the facts that since   is unitary, 
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In the particular case where 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which gives




  
, and that the set 
	

	
necessarily forms an orthonormal basis.
The proof is completed by observing that by lemma 4.5.1 any unitary orthonormal
basis applied uniformly is sufficient.
4.6 Encryption vs. Teleportation and Superdense Coding
One of the most interesting results in quantum information theory is the teleportation
of quantum bits by shared EPR pairs and classical channels[BBC93a]. The quantum
one time pad described in Section 4.3 could be implemented using the usual teleporta-
tion scheme by encrypting the classical communications with a one time pad. Hence,
teleportation gives one example of a quantum encryption algorithm. In the original
teleportation paper[BBC93a] a proof that two classical bits are required to teleport is
given. The proof is based on a construction that gives superluminal communication if
teleportation can be done with less than two bits. This proof however does not imply
that all quantum encryption sets require
 
  bits. To do so would require one to prove
that all quantum encryption sets correspond to a teleportation protocol. On the other
hand, as we show next, all teleportation protocols correspond to a quantum encryption
set; hence, Theorem 4.5.3 provides a new proof of optimality of teleportation.
A general teleportation scheme can be described as follows: Alice and Bob share a
pure state comprising
 
  qubits,  	 , such that the traced out   -bit states of Alice and
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Bob satisfy:    


	
. Next, Alice receives an unknown   -bit quantum state  ,
and performs a joint measurement (i.e., on  and   ), which produces one of a fixed
set of outcomes


,
 
 

     

 , each with probability


. The particular outcome

 is classically communicated to Bob using 
  

     



 bits. Bob performs a
corresponding unitary operation
	
 on his state to retrieve  . Hence, after Alice’s
measurement (and before Bob learns the outcome), Bob’s state can be expressed as



 
	 



 

  

	


	

 , which is exactly the encrypted state of the message,  ,
defined in Eqn. (4.1). Hence, every teleportation scheme corresponds to an encryption
protocol 



	

	
. Since we prove that all quantum encryption sets require
 
  classical
bits, then all teleportation schemes must also require     classical bits. Note that our
proof only relies on the properties of the underlying vector spaces.
Superdense coding[BW93] also has a connection to quantum encryption. Consider
the case where Alice asks Bob to encrypt something and then Alice wishes to learn
the key that Bob used to encrypt. In the case of the classical one time pad [Ver26]
     
, and so given a message and it’s accompanying ciphertext, one learns the
key:
     
. Quantumly, each quantum bit has two classical key bits to learn.
Due to Holevo’s theorem[Hol73] it may seem that this implies that there is no way to
learn the classical key exactly. This intuition is not correct. Alice can learn Bob’s key
in the following way. Alice prepares   singlets and gives half of each singlet to Bob.
Bob encrypts them using the simple quantum one time pad and returns them to Alice.
Alice can learn the key exactly by measuring each former singlet in the bell basis. The
outcome would tell Alice exactly which transformation Bob applied. This protocol
corresponds exactly to the superdense coding scheme[BW93].
Interestingly, some insight is gained as to where the factor of two between the
number of classical and quantum bits comes from in both encryption and teleportation.
In the case of classical bits,  is diagonal. A basis for all diagonal matrices is 2  .
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Hence, for encryption of classical bits there are only    equations. In the quantum
case, by lemma 4.4.1, there are  


equations to satisfy, so it is not too surprising that
there are twice as many classical bits needed. Equivalently, the
 
of the size of the
space is twice as large quantumly as opposed to classically. The proof given here could
be particularized to give a new proof of Shannon’s original result on informationally
secure classical encryption[Ver26].
4.7 Discussion
We have presented an algorithm for using
 
  secret classical bits to secure   quan-
tum bits. These encrypted quantum bits may now be held by an untrusted party with
no danger that information may be learned from these bits. Any number of appli-
cations may be imagined for this algorithm, or class of algorithms 



	

	
. For
instance, rather than using random classical data of size     , one could use a secret
key ciphers[Sch96] or stream ciphers[Sch96] to keep a small finite classical key, for
instance 256 bits, to generate pseudo-random bits to encrypt quantum data. In fact,
these notions allow for straight-forward generalizations of many classical protocols to
quantum data. Quantum secret sharing has been developed[CGL99] that may be used
to share quantum secrets. Classical secret sharing schemes are known that are infor-
mationally secure[Sha79]. By encrypting a quantum state of   bits with     classical
bits, and then using classical secret sharing on the
 
  bits, one may use these infor-
mationally secure classical methods in the quantum world. This protocol would allow
users with only classical resources to perform secret sharing given an untrusted center
to store the quantum data. One application independently suggested by Cre´peau et.
al.[CDM99] is to build quantum bit commitment schemes based on computationally
secure classical bit commitment schemes.
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CHAPTER 5
Mutually Unbiased Bases for Quantum States
5.1 Introduction
A
 
–level quantum system is described by a density operator  that requires
 

	
 
real numbers for its complete specification. A maximal orthogonal quantum test
performed on such a system has, without degeneracy,
 
possible outcomes, providing
  	
  independent probabilities. It follows that in principle one requires at least
  
 
different orthogonal measurements for complete state determination.
Since the quantum mechanical description of a physical system is characterized in
terms of probabilities of outcomes of conceivable experiments consistent with quan-
tum formalism, in order to obtain full information about the system under consider-
ation we need to perform measurements on a large number of identically prepared
copies of the system. The different measurements are performed on several subensem-
bles. However, there may be redundancy in the measurement results as the probabil-
ities will not, in general, be independent of each other unless a minimal set of mea-
surements satisfying appropriate criteria is specified. This minimal set need not be
necessarily optimal in the sense it may not serve the best way to ascertain the quantum
state. However, intuitively speaking, a minimal set of measurements can be reason-
ably close to an optimal set if they mutually differ as much as possible, thereby ruling
out possible overlaps in the results which become crucial in case of error prone mea-
surements. The characterization and proving the existence of such a minimal set of
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measurements for complete quantum state determination is therefore of fundamental
importance.
It has been shown that measurements in a special class of bases, i.e. mutually
unbiased bases, not only form a minimal set but also provide the optimal way of deter-
mining a quantum state. Mutually unbiased measurements (MUM), loosely speaking,
correspond to measurements that are as different as they can be so that each measure-
ment gives as much new information as one can obtain from the system under con-
sideration. In other words the MUM operators are maximally noncommuting among
themselves. If the result of one MUM can be predicted with certainty, then all possible
outcomes of every other measurement, unbiased to the previous one are equally likely.
As noted earlier mutually unbiased bases (MUB) have a special role in determin-
ing the state of a finite dimensional quantum system. Ivanovic [Iva81] first introduced
the concept of MUB in the context of quantum state determination, where he proved
the existence of such bases when the dimension is a prime by an explicit construc-
tion. Later Wootters and Fields [WF89] showed that measurements in MUB provide
the minimal as well as optimal way of complete specification of the density matrix.
The optimality is understood in the sense of minimization of statistical errors in the
measurements. By explicit construction they showed the existence of MUB for prime
power dimensions and proved that for any dimension
 
there can be at most
  
 
MUB. However the existence of MUB for other composite dimensions which are not
power of a prime still remains an open problem.
In this chapter we give a constructive proof of the results earlier obtained by
Ivanovic, Wootters, and Fields [Iva81, WF89] with a totally different method. The
two distinct features of our new proof are:
  Our approach is based on developing an interesting connection between maximal
commuting bases of orthogonal unitary matrices and mutually unbiased bases,
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whereby we find a necessary condition for existence of MUB in any dimen-
sion. We then provide a constructive proof of existence of MUB in composite
dimensions which are power of a prime. This allows us to connect encryption
of quantum bits [BR00], which uses unitary bases of operators, to quantum key
distribution, which uses mutually unbiased bases of quantum systems.
  Another advantage of our method is that we provide an explicit construction of
the MUB observables (operators) as tensor product of the Pauli matrices for di-
mensions
    
. This answers a critical related question: how can these mutu-
ally unbiased measurements be actually performed and what are the observables
to which these measurements correspond to. When      the mutually unbi-
ased operators are the three Pauli matrices, but unfortunately this observation
cannot be generalized in a straightforward way to higher dimension. In addition
to the obvious importance of mutually unbiased bases in the context of quantum
state determination and foundations of quantum mechanics, recently it has also
found useful applications in quantum cryptography where it has been demon-
strated that using higher dimensional quantum systems for key distribution has
possible advantages over qubits, and mutually unbiased bases play a key role in
such a key distribution scheme [BT00b, BT00a]. Thus the fact that we provide
an explicit construction of the MUB observables can turn out to be crucial in the
application of MUB in quantum cryptography with systems with more than two
states.
Before continuing it is useful to provide a formal definition of mutually unbiased
bases.
Definition. Let  
 

 


     




	
and  








     





	 be two orthonor-
mal bases in the   dimensional state space. They are said to be mutually unbiased bases
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(MUB) if and only if          



, for every   
 
 

     

 
. A set  


     



	
of
orthonormal bases in  

is called a set of mutually unbiased bases (a set of MUB) if
each pair of bases 

and 

are mutually unbiased.
The simplest example of a complete set of MUB is obtained in the case of spin 1/2
particle where each unbiased basis consists of the normalized eigenvectors of the three
Pauli matrices respectively. However, the analysis of a set of MUB corresponding to
a two level quantum system does not capture one of the basic features of MUB, i.e.,
its importance in determining the quantum state. In the case of two level systems, the
density operator has three independent parameters and almost any choice of the three
measurements is sufficient to have the complete knowledge of the system. This is not
true in general for any other dimension greater than two, where the existence of MUB
becomes more crucial in the context of minimal number of required measurements for
quantum state determination.
In Section 5.2 we show the existence of     MUB in the space    , for any prime  .
This result first shown by Ivanovic [Iva81] by explicitly defining the mutually unbiased
bases. Here we show that these bases are in fact bases each consists of eigenvectors of
the unitary operators
2






2

     



2




where


and 2 are generalizations of Pauli operators to the quantum systems with
more than two states (see, e.g., [Got99, GKP01]).
In Section 5.3 we show that there is a useful connection between mutually unbiased
bases and special types of bases for the space of the square matrices. These bases
consist of orthogonal unitary matrices which can be grouped in maximal classes of
commuting matrices. As a result of this connection we show that every MUB over  

consists of at most
  
  bases.
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Finally, in Section 5.4 we present our construction of MUB over  

when
 
is
a prime power. The basic idea of our construction is as follows. When      ,
imagine the system consists of

subsystems each of dimension

. Then the total
number of measurements on the whole system, viewed as performing measurement on
every subsystem in their respective MUB is
  
 

. We show that these
  
 

operators fall into
 
 
maximal noncommuting classes where members of each
class commute among themselves. The bases formed by eigenvectors of each such
mutually noncommuting class are mutually unbiased. It should be mentioned that the
operators in each maximal commuting class have the same structure as the stabilizers
of additive quantum error correcting codes (see, e.g., [CRS97, CRS98, Got99]).
There is a close connection between the MUB problem and the problem of deter-
mining arrangements of lines in the Grassmannian spaces so that they are as far apart
as possible [CCK97] (see also [CHR99]). This problem (and some other combina-
torial problems discussed in [CCK97]) can be related to the problem of finding the
maximum number of lines through the origin of  

that are either perpendicular or are
at angle   , where 
 
 

 
5


 
. Any MUB  defines such a line–set: consider all
lines through the origin defined by all vectors in the bases of  . In [CCK97], for the
case of
    

, with an approach similar to the one presented in this chapter, such
line–sets are constructed.
Notation. Let  

 
 be the set of
    
complex matrices. In a natural way, the
set  

 
 is a
 

–dimensional linear space. Each matrix
 
in  

 

can be also
naturally considered as a  

–dimensional complex vector     , where the entries of
the matrix
 
being regarded as the components of the vector     . In this way, for
matrices
 

 




 

we can define the inner product 
 

 

of matrices as the
inner product   




of vectors. It is easy to check that

 

 

 

  
 

 
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We say the matrices
 

 




 

are orthogonal if and only if 
 

 

flfi
.
5.2 Construction of Sets of MUB for Prime Dimensions
Ivanovic [Iva81] for the first time showed that for any prime dimension   , there is a set
of
  
 
mutually unbiased bases. In that paper the bases are given explicitly. Here we
show that there is a nice symmetrical structure behind these bases, and their existence
can be derived as a consequence of properties of Pauli operators on   –state quantum
systems. The core of our construction is the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2.1 Let 
 

 


     



 	 be an orthonormal basis in  

. Suppose
that there is a unitary operator

such that
   



 



, where


 
 
and





  

; i.e.,

applies a cyclic shift modulo a phase on the elements of the basis


. Assume that the orthonormal basis 








     




 	
consists of eigenvectors
of  . Then   and   are MUB.
Proof.Assume that
 










. Then
 

 
 
. Now, for every
 
 

     

 
, we
have




 

   





	   


 









 



 



 
A similar argument shows




 

  






 
  
 







 
Therefore,




  




 
 

 
    
 
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Thus 

and 

are MUB.
Throughout this section, we suppose that
 
is a prime number, and all algebraic
operations are modulo
 
. We consider 
 fi



  

     

   	
  	
as the standard basis of
 

. We define the unitary operators 
  and 2  over  

, as a natural generalization of
Pauli operators    and  
 
:



 

   
  
 (5.1)
2

 

  

 

 (5.2)
where
 
is a
 
root of unity; more specifically
       
 
5
 

. We are interested
in unitary operators of the form




2



. Note that




2



 



 



  
  
 
Theorem 5.2.2 For
fi  


   	
 
, the eigenvectors of 
   2  

are cyclically
shifted under the action of 
   2  

.
Proof.The eigenvectors of




2



are






 


 





 


 






 





 



flfi

     

  	
 
 (5.3)
where
   
  
    	
 
. Then




 is an eigenvector of




2



with eigenvalue
 

, because




2









 


 





 


 






 






 



  
  

 


 





 


 






 





 
&
  
  

 


 





 


 








 





 

  






 
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The action of




2



on




 is as follows:




2









 


 





 


 






 






 



  
  

 


 





 


 








 





$'&

 





 


 





 





 


 






 






 







 



 


 







 





 


 






 






 





 


 







 





 


 










 





 

  














 
Note that the standard basis 
 fi



  

     

   	
   	 is the set of the eigenvectors
of 2  . From (5.3) it follows that the  
 

 




 
 




. Therefore, we have proved the
following construction.
Theorem 5.2.3 For any prime   , the set of the bases each consisting of the eigenvec-
tors of
2









2






2




     





2






form a set of      mutually unbiased bases.
Example
   
. By Theorem 5.2.3, the eigenvectors of the operators     ,    , and       
form a set of mutually unbiased bases; i.e., the following set

 fi



  	

 




















 






















 
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Example
    
. The set of the eigenvectors of the following unitary matrices form a
set of MUB (here           5    ):
 




 
fi fi
fi
 
fi
fi fi
 





 




fi fi
 
 
fi fi
fi
 
fi





 




fi fi  

 
fi fi
fi   fi





 




fi fi  
 
fi fi
fi  

fi




 
5.3 Bases for Unitary Operators and MUB
In this section we study the close relation between MUB and a special type of bases
for  

 

. Here we are dealing with classes of commuting unitary matrices. The
following lemma shows that the maximum size of such class is
 
.
Lemma 5.3.1 There are at most   pairwise orthogonal commuting unitary matrices
in  

 

.
Proof.Let
 


     

 
 be pairwise orthogonal commuting unitary matrices in  

 

.
Then there is a unitary matrix
	
such that the matrices  


     

 
 , where  

	
 
 	

, are diagonal. Moreover,   


 




 


 


; so  

and    are orthogonal
for
 
. Let
 
 
 

be the diagonal of  

. Then   


 




  


. So the
vectors



     




are mutually orthogonal; therefore,
   
.
Let 


	 

	


     

	


	 be a basis of unitary matrices for       . Without loss
of generality, we can assume that
	  
	
 , the identity matrix of order
 
. We say that
the basis  is a maximal commuting basis for  

 
 if  can be partitioned as




	


 


  

 



 (5.4)
where each class  

contains exactly
  	
 
commuting matrix from  . Note that


	

	
 

is a set of
 
commuting orthogonal unitary matrices, which by Lemma 5.3.1
is maximal.
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Theorem 5.3.1 If there is a maximal commuting basis of orthogonal unitary matrices
in  

 

, then there is a set of      mutually unbiased bases.
Proof.Let  be a maximal commuting basis of orthogonal unitary matrices in



 

, where (5.4) provides the decomposition of  into maximal classes of com-
muting matrices. For any  
     
 
, let
 
 

	 



	 



     

	 
 


	
 
We also define
	 


 
	
 ; then
 
	



	 



	 



	 



     

	 
 


	
is a maximal set of commuting orthogonal unitary matrices. Thus for each  
  
  
 
, there is an orthonormal basis

   











     





 
such that every matrix
	 


(for fi      	   ) relative to the basis   is diagonal. Let
	 






 

 




 
 







 
 
  (5.5)
Let 

be a
    
matrix whose
  
row is the diagonal of the right-hand side matrix
of (5.5); i.e.,

 
 







 



  




     
 


 
 



  




     
 


 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
 



  
 




     
 
 


 








 
Then 

is a unitary matrix. Note that the first row of 

is the constant vector

 

 

     

  
. We consider the classes  

and  

. Then for
fi  


   	
 
, the
orthogonality condition implies
 

	 



	




   







 
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But, since
  



 
















,


	 



	




 
 



 




 












 





















 




 























  
 







 
 





 




 













 
 









 
 

 
Therefore



 




 













 
 









 
 

    







fi  


   	
 
  (5.6)
The system of equations (5.6) can be written in the following matrix form
 

 

where
 









  
 
 









 
 


 
 









 
 


     

 
 









 
 

 

    

fi

fi

     

fi

 
 
Note that
 
is a unitary matrix and its first row is the constant vector

 

 

     

  
.
Then from 

 



it follows
















 
 


  
 
By repeating the same argument for the classes  

and    , we conclude that
 


     





	
is a set of MUB.
Before we continue, we prove the following useful simple lemma.
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Lemma 5.3.2 For any integers  and   such that fi       we have



 

ffi

	

 
(

 fi
 
Proof.We have



 


ffi

	

  


flffi

	

  

ffi

	

 



	
 
ffi

	

 

	
 
flfi
 
The converse of Theorem 5.3.1, in the following sense, holds.
Theorem 5.3.2 Let             be a set of MUB in    . Then there are  classes
 


     

 
 each consisting of   commuting unitary matrices such that matrices in
 


  

 
 are pairwise orthogonal.
Proof.Suppose that

   





     





 
 
Then









 




 
 


  

and
 
 









 
 


 
 

 
 
 
   

 
 


  
 
We label the matrices in the class  

as
 
 

	 



	 



     

	 
 


	

where
	 






 

ffi

	
 
(

 
 



 



 
 

fi 

   	
 
 
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Note that
	 


 
	

. Then
	 


and 	  

are commuting, because both are diagonal
relative to the basis 

. We now show that all these matrices are orthogonal. First we
note that

	 



	




 

	 



	








 



 
 

ffi

	

  
$


 












 



 






 



 
 

ffi

	

  
$


 
 







 

 
 

 
Thus, by Lemma 5.3.2, if    , then

	 



	 







 



 
 

ffi

	

  
$




 




 

ffi

	


 
$


   



 
If
  
and  


 *fi

fi

, then

	 



	








 



 
 

ffi

	

  
$
	

 
 

 
 
 



 

ffi

	

	



 


 
 

ffi

	

  


 fi
 
As an immediate corollary of the above theorem, we have the following upper
bound on the size of a set of MUB.
Theorem 5.3.3 Any set of mutually unbiased bases in    contains at most      bases.
Proof.If a set of MUB contains
 bases, then by Theorem 5.3.2, there are at least   
    	
  pairwise orthogonal matrices in the
 

–dimensional space  

 

. Therefore,
 
     	
 
  

, thus
    
 
.
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5.4 Construction of a Set of MUB for Prime Powers
5.4.1 The Pauli Group
To construct a maximal set of MUB in
  
 

 
, where

is a prime number, we
consider the Hilbert space   as tensor product of

copies of    ; i.e.,
  
 

    
 

   
 
 

 
Like the case of    , we build a set of MUB as the sets of eigenvectors of special types
of unitary operators on the background space   . On the space    we considered the
generalized Pauli operators


 and 2  , defined by equations (5.1) and (5.2). On the
space
 
, we consider the tensor products of operators 
  and 2  .
We denote the finite field 
fi

 

     

 	
  	 by   . Let
   ffi

	

0
 be a primitive
  
root of unity. Then
2




   


2
  
Therefore, if
	   




&

2



& and 	

 






2




then
	

	    

&






&
	  	

  (5.7)
We are interested on unitary operators on  

 


  

 
 (the tensor product of 
copies of    ) of the form
	 

 
  




where 
  






2




,
fi   


   	
 
. (5.8)
To describe an operator of the form (5.8) it is enough to specify the powers   and   .
So we represent an operator (5.8) by the following vector of length    over the field

 :
 

     







     





or equivalently as



 

     




2





     




 
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If we let 
  

     




and

   

     




, then  





and we denote the
corresponding operator by






2




 
The Pauli group  
 


 is the group of all unitary operators on
  
 

    
 

(the tensor product of  copies of    ) of the form
 







2




 (5.9)
for some integer


fi
and vectors  





, where
         
 
5


. In this section
we are mainly interested in the subset  

 



of  
 



of the operators of the form
(5.9) with  flfi . Note that         is not a subgroup, but generators of subgroups of
the Pauli group can always be considered as subsets of   
 



.
If the operators
	
and 	 	 in   
 



are represented by the vectors
 

     







     




and  	          	 

	


     


	



respectively, then
	
and
	
	
are commuting if and only if



 

 

	

	



 


	


 flfi    
 
We can state this condition equivalently in the following form.
Lemma 5.4.1 If 	  
     2  


and 	 	  
    	  2  

	

, for  



	


	




,
then
	
and 	 	 are commuting if and only if



	
	

	 

 fi    
  (5.10)
A set







2






     








2





of operators in   
 


 is represented by
the

    

matrix
 








.
.
.
.
.
.









 
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Before we continue, we would like to get an explicit formula for the action of a
  
 



operator






2




. Let 
 



     




and

 



     




. The
standard basis of the Hilbert space  

 
     
 

consists of the vectors
      


,
where
 '

     



 



. Then






2




 '    


  

&

&

  


 

 
  '



    





 
Equivalently,






2





 

   



 




 




 (5.11)






2




 

  
 
  



 


 
 

 (5.12)
where the operations are in the field   .
Theorem 5.4.1 Let
	  





2




and
	
	
 




	

2



	
 be operators in   
 



.
If 	  	 	 , i.e.,   


 

	


	

, then the operators 	 and 	 	 are orthogonal.
Proof.We have

	

	
	

  

	

	
	

  
 



  
 


  
 
 


 


 
 

 



 


	

 






  

 
 


 




 



 


	

 
If 


	
, then   



 


	

 fi
, for every   



. Thus in this case 
	

	
	

 fi
.
If 


	
and



	
then, by Lemma 5.3.2,

	

	
	




  

 
 







 fi
 
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5.4.2 The General Construction
Our scheme for constructing a set of MUB is based on Theorem 5.3.1. The maximal
commuting orthogonal basis for    

 

with partition of the form (5.4) is such that
each class 

	

	
 

, in the following sense, is a linear space of operators in the Pauli
group  
 



. Let







2






     







 

2




 

be the operators in the class 
 	

	 
 

. We say that this class is linear if the set of the
vectors

 



 




     




 



 
 	
form an

–dimensional subspace of  


. In this case, to specify a linear class, it is
enough to present a basis for the subspace 

. Such a basis can be represented by an
    

matrix. So instead of listing all operators in the classes  


     

 

 


, we
could simply list the     matrices representing the bases of these classes.
More specifically, the bases of linear classes of operators in our construction are
represented by the matrices
*fi

  	



  	


 



     

 
	


 

 


where
fi
 is the all–zero matrix of order

and each
 

is an
  
matrix over

 . It
easy to see what conditions should be imposed on the matrices
 

so that the require-
ments of Theorem 5.3.1 satisfied. The following lemma gives a simple necessary and
sufficient condition for operators in each class commuting. Note that in a linear class
of operators, if the basic operators are commuting then any pair of operators in these
class will commute.
Lemma 5.4.2 Let
 
be a set of  operators in  
      , and   be represented by
the matrix
 
	


 

, where
 	
 is the identity matrix of order  and   is an   
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matrix over

 . Then the operators in
 
are pairwise commuting if and only if   is a
symmetric matrix.
Proof.Let
 
 
 



. Then, by (5.10),   is a set of commuting operators if and only
if  


	
 

  fi    
, for every  
 
 
  
. Since  




 ,
 
is a set of
commuting operators if and only if
 
is symmetric.
The other condition is that the classes  

and    should be disjoint. This condition
is met if the span of the matrices
  	


 


and  
	  
 


are disjoint. The last condition
is equivalent to  
 
 
 
 

, for every non–zero   



. The last condition is
equivalent to
	 
 
 	
 


 fi
. Thus we can summarize our construction in the
following theorem.
Theorem 5.4.2 Let 
 


     

 

	 be a set of symmetric    matrices over   such
that 	 
 
 	
 


flfi
, for every          . Then there is a set of     mutually
unbiased bases on   
 
.
More specifically, the


  bases of the above theorem are represented by the
matrices
.fi

 
	



 
	


 



     

 
	


 


 
Example
   
. The four matrices (over     fi    	 ) which satisfy the conditions of
Theorem 5.4.2 are
 

fi fi
fi fi



 

 
fi
fi
 



 

fi
 
   



 

   
 
fi


  (5.13)
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Therefore the classes of maximal commuting operators are
  


2
 	

	 
2

2

2
	

 
 


  	

	  



  

	

 




 	

	 
  


	

 




 
2

2

  
 

	

 
 




2

2
 



 

	

where
	

 
 
fi
fi
 



 
 
fi
 
 
fi

 

 
fi 	
 
 
fi



2

2

 
 
fi
fi 	
 

 
We represent this basis explicitly. To this end, we naturally represent each basis by a
  
matrix such that the
 
row of this matrix is the components of the
  
vector
of the corresponding basis with respect to the standard basis
 fi fi


 fi
  


 
fi



   
: the
first matrix is  
  	
 
, and

 
 
 
 







       
 
	
 
	
   
   
	
 
	
 
 
	
   
	
 











 
 
 







     
	
 
 
	
 
	
 
	
 
   
	
   
 
	
     











 
 
 







   
	
   
 
	
     
     
	
 
 
	
 
	
 
	
 










 

 
 
 







 
	
     
   
	
   
     
	
 
 
	
 
	
 
	
 








 
Note that, in this case, the mutually unbiasedness condition is equivalent to the condi-
tion that 




  	
 
, for every
fi 
 
 
, and each entry of 




, for
fi 
   
  
,
has absolute value equal to


.
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5.4.3 Construction for     
By Theorem 5.4.2, to construct      mutually unbiased bases in   
 
, we only need
to find

symmetric nonsingular matrices  


     

 





 

such that the matrix



 

 

 

is also nonsingular, for every nonzero vector

 


     

 

 



. Because
if this condition satisfied then the
 
matrices



 

 

 



 


     

 

 




satisfy the condition of Theorem 5.4.2.
Example
   
. The following eight
   
matrices determine a set 9 mutually unbiased
bases on  

. Let
 
  
 (the zero matrix),      	  , and
 


 




fi
 
fi
     
fi
   




 
 

 




fi fi
 
fi
   
   
fi




 

 




   
fi
 
fi
 
fi
 
fi




 

 




 
fi
 
fi fi
 
     




 

 




fi
   
 
fi fi
 
fi
 




 


 




     
   
fi
 
fi fi




Note that these matrices are of the following general form:
 

 




 
fi fi
fi
 
fi
fi fi
 





 

 




fi
 
fi
     
fi
   





 

 




fi fi
 
fi
   
   
fi





 


 


 




 
Wootters and Fields [WF89] have found the following general construction for the
matrices  


     

 

. Let


     


 be a basis of     as a vector space over   . Then
any element
   



  can be written uniquely as
    



 

 

 
 
 
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Then  
 
  

 

; i.e., the

 




entry of  

is  

 
.
5.4.3.1 A set of MUB for the case  

We would like to mention here that for the case
   

, there is a more explicit
construction. We find


matrices
 


     

 


over

 which satisfy the conditions of
Theorem 5.4.2. For this purpose, we let
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 

 



 


 





where





 are two constants which their value need to be determined. By con-
struction, the matrix
 

is symmetric, so we have to choose the values of the parame-
ters

and

such that
	 
 
 	
 


 fi
, for every  
 
 
  

. Let 

 
 	
 

and


 
6	
 

. Then





 *fi

fi

, and we have
	  
 
6	
 










 
 
 
 
 
 








 
 
 
 
 
 
 






	


 
If 
flfi
, then






 	


flfi
. Suppose now that 
 fi
, and let

5

 
. Then






 	


 

	

 	 

 
Thus






fi
if the quadratic polynomial 

	

 	 
is irreducible over   . Since
for every prime

there is at least one irreducible quadratic polynomial over   , it is
possible to choose the parameters





 such that






flfi
, for every  



 .
Example
   
. The four matrices (5.13) are obtained from the irreducible polynomial


  
 
over


. Therefore, all those matrices are of the following form
 
   
   

 


 

 



 
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Example
    
. The polynomial


    
is irreducible over   . Therefore, the
matrices
 

are of the general form of
 
   
   
  
 

 
So the nine matrices are
 
fi fi
fi fi


 
 
fi
fi
 


 
  fi
fi  


 
fi
 
 
 


 
   
 
fi


 
fi  
 
 


 

 
 
   



 

 
 
   



 

   
  fi


 
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we partially solved the problem of existence of sets of MUB in compos-
ite dimensions. We formulated an interesting connection between maximal commuting
basis of orthogonal unitary matrices and sets of MUB. We obtained the necessary con-
dition for the existence of sets of MUB in any dimension. Using these we proved the
existence of sets of MUB for dimensions which are prime power. We provided a sharp
upper bound on the size of any MUB for any dimension. We expressed the sets of
MUB observables as tensor products of Pauli matrices. However we could not apply
this method when the dimension
 
is a product of different primes instead of being a
prime power (the simplest case that belongs to this category is when     ) because
if we do so the convenient properties of the case      no longer remain valid. For
instance Theorem 5.4.2 does not hold in this case.
A useful application of our result is in secure key distribution using higher di-
mensional quantum systems. Specifically we note that the protocol suggested by
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Bechmann–Pasquinucci and Tittel [BT00a] using four dimensional quantum system
will become more efficient if all the five mutually unbiased bases are used in the pro-
tocol instead of only two as suggested by the authors.
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CHAPTER 6
A Quantum Protocol for Anonymous Broadcasts
6.1 Introduction
Quantum information has introduced many exciting new tools such as the qubit, tele-
portation of quantum information, ultra-fast quantum computation, and quantum cryp-
tography protocols. In most cases, these exciting developments are beyond what is
possible in the classical information theoretic setting. In particular, using quantum
cryptography, a secret key can be generated over a channel by two participants that
is informationally secure. This is impossible in classical cryptography. In this paper,
the basic tools of quantum cryptography are used to build a multi-participant protocol
which gives the participants the ability to anonymously announce classical informa-
tion. This protocol is shown to be secure against any and all attacks. By security, we
mean the following: an eavesdropper learns nothing about who sent a particular mes-
sage by eavesdropping on the channel. This is not to say that an eavesdropper has no
idea who sent a particular message. Given the content of the message, the eavesdrop-
per may be able to guess which of the players might have sent it; however, no protocol
could ever change that.
There does exist a classical protocol for anonymous broadcasts[Cha88]. However,
the existing classical protocols have two problems. First, they require perfectly secret
channels, which is only possible classically with a one time pad[Ver26]. Second, if
there are   participants, there must be a factor of   more communication than for
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a non-anonymous broadcast. The current protocol increases the cost of anonymous
broadcasts by a constant factor over that of non-anonymous broadcasts. However,
the factor is independent of the number of participants, unlike the protocol given in
[Cha88], where the factor is the number of users,   .
This protocol has many obvious uses: for instance, it is known classically that
a secure anonymous channel implies informationally secure key distribution [AS83].
Furthermore, the ability to make information known anonymously is important in a
society that values the freedom of speech and information. For instance, whistle-
blowing, criticizing the government, or tipping off the police are a few of the things
that people may prefer to do anonymously. From the standpoint of cryptography, the
anonymous channel is an interesting tool that may now be added to the tool box of the
quantum cryptographer. This tool joins the ranks of quantum key distribution[BB84,
Ben92], quantum oblivious transfer given bit commitment[Yao95, May96], and, more
recently, quantum gambling[GVW99], all of which have been shown to be secure. It
should be noted that quantum bit commitment and coin tossing have been shown to
be impossible[May97, LC98]. Bit committment and coin tossing are important primi-
tives, and are not possible using only the tools of quantum information. This raises the
question: which protocols can be made secure with quantum information, and which
cannot? In this regard, our contribution shows that a protocol for an anonymous chan-
nel can be constructed using only the tools of quantum information.
6.2 Protocol for a Quantum Anonymous Channel
The protocol is based on quantum teleportation[BBC93a]. There are   users of the
protocol. There are two types of channels we will speak of: first, the virtual anonymous
channel that the protocol will create, and, second, the physical quantum channels that
connect neighboring users. So, user   (U  ) has a quantum channel to U    and U    .
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Figure 6.1: Anonymous channel with 5 users.
1. U

sends half of a Bell state



 fi fi

 
    %
to U



. Now each user shares half
a Bell state with each of his neighbors.
2. Each user tests these two bits with probability





. If the user tests, both bits
should be measured in the  basis. Otherwise, the user performs a Bell mea-
surement on the two bits. The quantum part of the protocol is now over. The
remaining steps involve classical processing of the measurements.
3. Each user makes an announcement: if U

tested, he announces the outcome of
the measurement made on the bit received from U



. If the user did not test, he
announces the

measurement on the Bell basis.
4. After all the above announcements have been made, each user announces whether
or not he performed a test.
5. If no user tested, this bit is added to a string of bits  	  to be used for sending
anonymous messages (information bits). If the bit is a test bit, all measurements
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that were not previously announced are now announced (the other  basis mea-
surement for testers, and the  basis Bell measurement for those that did not
test).
Note that it is crucial that step 3 happens before step 4. If step 4 occurs before 3 then
a potential eavesdropper knows when to avoid attacking, and hence could never be
detected. The point of step 3 is that the eavesdropper must commit to applying her
attack before she knows if the bit will be used for testing.
6.2.1 Testing
In the case where there were some number of users that tested, the shared Bell states
serve to create a teleportation channel between the testers. Hence, the testers verify
that states sent in the

basis have high fidelity along random sections of the network.
If each user tests with probability





, then the probability that someone tests is
 
	 
 
	 




 
. The probability that no one tests, and hence that the channel is used,
is given by     
 
 
	 





 
. If







5
  , note that
   
 

 


 ffi


and

 


 ffi


. So, the probability that a bit is used for sending information is constant
even as   goes to infinity. The probability that a particular player tests a particular bit
goes as   5   .
For each user, we can consider
 
 
	
 
channels: the channels for which he is
the “starting node” for each of the other users (which provides   	   channels), and
the channel where he is the “ending node” for each of the other users (an additional
 
	
 
channels). Since each user tests with equal probability, we can calculate the
probability of testing each of these channels:








 

 
 
	

5
 

 




5
 
 (6.1)
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For each channel,  
  
 
	
 
, so

5
   







 



 
	

5
 

 




5
 

 
If we and look at the limit as      , then:
   
 








 


   
 

 
	

 

 







 ffi







Hence, given that a user tested, he will test the channel between him and another
user with probability
 

 

. Since each user tests with probability  5   , if there are


 


test bits, then there are a constant number of tests of each channel. Note that
this is different than the classical case[Cha88], which requires  

times as many bits
to be sent. The reason for the  

factor in both cases is the fact that there are  

con-
nections; however, in our case, the security exponent will be a function of the number
of bits tested divided by  

. This does not mean that we need to use


 

 bits to
send each message. It only means that the message should be long when compared to
 

so that each user has many test bits for each message.
The fidelity of each of these channels in the

basis is measured by the tests per-
formed by the users. All of these fidelities should be high in order to ensure secrity of
the protocol. In section 6.4, we will see how high the fidelity needs to be.
6.2.2 Error Correction and Privacy Amplification
Given that the above test is passed, the remaining bits are used to send anonymous
messages. The bits from the measurement done by the users in step 2 gives each user
a string of bits (  	 ). If there were no errors on the channels used to share the EPR
pairs, the parity of these measurements would be zero. Since there can be errors in the
channel, the parity of all bits may not necessarily be zero. We denote the  basis error
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between U  and U    as ffi  . These errors would accumulate in the parity:
 
 


 

	




 
ffi  
 
ffi (6.2)
These errors must be corrected. Additionally, Eve, due to her interaction, may have
some knowledge about what each user measured. To combat this, a privacy amplifi-
cation technique is employed: Eve will be required to learn the syndrome of U

’s bits,
 
	

.
To send information, two codes are used 




, with

fi
	







  


  (6.3)
where 

  
  is the binary vector space on   bits. One code (   ) corrects any errors
on the information bits. 

can be thought of as a “privacy amplification” code. 

has
some parity check matrix associated with it   , and all code words    

have the
relation:



   fi
. 

has some parity check matrix


, and all code words   

have the relation:




fi
. Since 




, all   

also satisfy:




 fi
, and,
for
  



,



  flfi
.
The error correction is used in the following way: a code word has some errors on
it
  ffi
. The message is the coset of 

in 

that also includes

. The vector
  ffi
is
error-corrected with 

to

, and the parity of  is computed:



   ffi





 



ffi
 fi 



ffi
If the error is small enough to be corrected, ffi is now obtained. Consider   
 
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where




and   

. The message is:


   

 

 

 



 

 
 fi  

 
 
For the anonymous channel, each user U

announces  
  
	

 
, with


    
,
where
 
is the message U

wants to announce. With this public information, anyone
can compute:






 









 
	

 








ffi    







ffi  










ffi
Making use of the error correcting code,
ffi
is computed. We may now compute the
output of the channel:



*ffi 


 























 
We reserve the message
fi
for the  
	  
message. We say a user U

uses a channel
if
   fi
. If each player uses the channel with probability  5   , then the probability
that one or less persons used the channel is close to
ffi

 
, providing a constant fraction
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of the total capacity. In the case of a collision (i.e. two users speaking at one time),
each user will notice that their intended message was not broadecast successfully. They
then simply resend the message with probability

5
  until successful.
6.3 A Protocol Based on Quantum Error Correction Codes
Recently a method of proving security for quantum protocols that relies on quantum
error correction codes was developed [SP00]. For a given protocol, one gives an al-
ternate protocol based on quantum error correction codes that looks the same to Eve.
What we mean is that all the classical announcements and quantum states would look
exactly the same to Eve in this QECC based scheme, and therefore Eve cannot even
know which protocol the participants are using. Since in the QECC case, the play-
ers could have corrected all the errors that Eve causes, the security result needs only
to consider cases where the fidelity is exponentially close to unity, without having to
worry about the announcements done for the error correction.
The basic idea is that the original protocol was equivalent to teleporting a qubit
around a ring. Instead, we can consider just passing a qubit around a channel, with
each user randomly applying a Pauli matrix to the qubit. In the end, the person that
“sent” the qubit could measure it and see how the output differs from what they sent.
Each user could then announce the exclusive OR of whether they applied    and his
message bit. The user which “sent” the qubit would announce the parity of what he
sent, what he measured, and his message bit. Testing would proceed in the same
fashion. Each player would measure the bit with some probability in the

basis and
send a random bit in the

basis. At the end of each round, they announce if each bit
was a test bit.
In the following we denote U

to be user number   .
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1. U  initiates a round by preparing   bit state
 fi 
 in the CSS code given by
fi






:
 fi 



 


&

   


  

. U  chooses
  
tests bits with the
value
 fi  

, and

 bits with the value
 fi


. He concatenates these test bits
to the end of the code and applies a random permutation,

. Next, he en-
crypts the entire state (see chapter 4) by choosing two random          bit
strings,


 
and


 , and applying  
 
&

 
and  
 
&



. This produces the state:

 


&


  


#	
  


&
    


.
2. U  sends the state to U

. Note that, from Eve’s point of view, since the state is
encrypted, it is totally mixed.
3. U

measures each bit in the

basis with probability





 
. U

replaces the
measured bits  fi   .
4. U

chooses new random values

 



. He encrypts the state to obtain the new
keys.
5. The above 3 steps are repeated for each user until the state gets back to U  .
6. U  applies the inverse permutation  

and measures the



-basis test bits and
the
  
 -basis test bits.
7. Each bit may or may not have been tested by player   . For each tested bit, the
user announces the value he measured. For each untested bit, he announces the
value of

  for that bit. The user does not disclose whether or not the bit was a
test bit.
8. After all players complete step 7, they each announce which bits they tested.
They also announce the values for
 
  for these bits. At this point, the fidelity in
the
 basis between any two players can be determined. If any fidelity is too low,
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the protocol is aborted. If any user tested any one of the code bits or

-basis test
bits (the first       bits in U  ’s unpermuted ordering), the protocol is aborted.
9. U  discloses  . All users announce    for the    test bits in the  -basis. If the
fidelity is too low, the protocol is aborted.
10. Defining

	

 to be the values of
 
 which have not yet been announced, each
user announces  
  
	


  
, where
 
is a codeword from 

. U  XORs this
 

with his state.
11. The state U  holds looks like:
 





0


  


    ffi


	




 



 





0


  


    ffi 


 


where
ffi
is the error. Correcting the error, U  obtains:
 





0


  


   


 


U  computes the


parity of this state and announces it; this is the output of the
channel.
In the next section, we will show that the above protocol is secure. This protocol
will only succeed a small number of times due to the probability that some user tests
one of the code bits. To remedy this, U  could have made an alternate state preparation:
he could have simply prepared  
   
 EPR pairs and sent them into the channel.
Only after step 8 would U  project some   untested bits onto a quantum code word.
From Eve’s point of view, this is equivalent to the above case. Instead of each user ap-
plying a random set of Pauli matrices to encrypt the state in step 4, a user could prepare
an EPR pair and measure the incoming bit in the Bell basis. This act of teleporting the
state will have the effect of applying a random Pauli matrix to the state[BBC93a]. U 
only makes use of the quantum code in one basis (namely the

-basis), so instead of
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  
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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Eve chooses a measurement
after all anouncements

	
Figure 6.2: Eve attacks the state before and after a user applies  
 

.
projecting his state into a quantum code word, he could wait to receive the final state
from U   

, measure that state with the one he holds, and perform the error correction
and syndrome measurements on the collapsed states. At that point, the protocol is
identical to one in the first part of the paper.
6.4 Security of the QECC protocol
Since the announcement from the anonymous channel is public, Eve is concerned with
who is responsible for a given announcement. Each user announces  	    , and Eve
wants to know if


 
is equal to the outcome of the channel.
Since the protocol is aborted if the  -basis error rate between any two parties ex-
ceeds what the code can correct, if we show that the protocol is secure for the case
without error correction or privacy amplification, but with

-basis fidelity exponen-
tially close to   , then the security result will apply to the QECC protocol. We call the
case with no error correction or privacy amplification the simple case.
In the simple case, each user U

receives a state and XORs the state with a random

. Subsequently, U  announces     . Eve’s job is learn if    fi . The most
general attack is depicted in figure 6.2. Eve does not, in general, know the state that is
129
coming into U

, and wishes only to learn the change that U  effects in the

-basis. We
can assume that she applies some unitary operation
	 before U  and  after U  on her
ancillary states. She waits until the end of the protocol, when all announcements have
been, made in order to try to learn if what U

announced was

.
In the following section, we show that the bounds derived in chapter 2 can apply
(with slight modifications) to the above two-sided attack to obtain:
	 


  



 

    


 

   

 

 
	 


 (6.4)
where



 is the minimum fidelity in the  basis of any channel that passes through or
terminates with the user. For the simple case, we assume this to be exponentially close
to unity, and hence we have security. In the error correction code protocol, the code
provides a fidelity exponentially close to one; hence, we have security. Finally, since
we showed that if the error-correction-based protocol was secure, then the original
protocol is secure; therefore, the original protocol is secure. This proof follows the
reduction technique introduced in [SP00].
6.5 Reducing Two-Sided Attacks to One-Sided Attacks
In chapter 2, we considered the case that Eve does a normal attack on qubit with an
unknown value in the  -basis. In the anonymous channel protocol, Eve has the oppor-
tunity to attack the qubit before it arrives to the user, and again afterwards. Intuitively,
if the fidelity in the  -basis is high for all Eve’s attacks, then her attacks should com-
mute with    , which is the operator that the user may or may not apply. In this section,
we formalize this result. It will very closely mirror theorem 2.4.2.
Theorem 6.5.1 If an eavesdropper performs the most general two-sided attack on a
user who applies   
 
to his incoming state, with





, and subsequently an-
nounces  
   
, then the most information the eavesdropper can learn about any
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function of the message is bounded by the minimum fidelity the attack would give in
the

-basis:
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Proof.The proof will follow closely theorem 2.4.2. The major difference will be that
we will consider attacks of the form depicted in figure 6.2. The input into the attack
will be a random state is the

-basis.
The input state that comes towards the user is a uniformly selected state in the  -
basis. This variable will be denoted as 
 . 
 is by definition independent of  ,  ,
and
  (the key, message, and announcement, respectively). Using the above facts, we
see that
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, hence:
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So, if we want to bound 	









 

, it is sufficient to bound 	









 




.
The states that Eve has consistent with
 
 


  given a particular announcement
  and input state

are:
 

 


 



  





 






where 



 





 



, and    is the state that Eve would have if the user applies
 

 
to an input state
 

 
. Since

 is independent of

, we see that 

is independent
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of   . The average of such states is:
 

 





 

 

 


 





 






Since

 is independent of

, and since each input to the function
 
has one output, we
obtain:
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
 
 






From lemma 2.2.3 we have:
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Making use of the triangle inequality, we can obtain the following:
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 (6.5)
for any choice of      	 and  

 

	
. Our approach will be to choose those states to be the
ones that Eve would hold if, instead of the two-sided attack, the   
 
had been applied
to the input state
 

 
, and Eve had then applied her two-sided attack,
	
then

.
We will use the sum notation for the first part of Eve’s attack,
	
:
	   fi

 
   









 

So, if we look at the user’s and Eve’s state together, after everything depicted in figure
6.2, we would have:





  *








  



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Thus,   
 












. The


 
 ffi  
states will be derived from the case where
the user applies   
 
before Eve does any attack:


	



   









  



Thus,  	 
 


 

	




	




.
There are three terms in the right-hand side of equation 6.5. In theorem 2.4.2, we
saw how to bound the first term. We now will handle the second and third terms from
equation 6.5 in turn.
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All of the above is obtained merely by applying the triangle inequality and results from
chapter 2. We still need to look at the term under the square root in the last line of the
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above:
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where


is the probability that the attack would cause no error in the

-basis1.
We must finally look at the third term in equation 6.5.
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Where we made use of the same connection to error rates as in the previous equations.
Putting these two bounds together with theorem 2.4.2, we have:
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8
refer back to chapter 2, theorem 2.4.1 to see this worked out in detail
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Note that the second and third terms in equation 6.5 yeilded bounds that only depend
on the fidelity of one of the sides, but the first term depends on the fidelity of the
two sides considered as one attack. Of course, all the fidelities are greater than the
minimum fidelity measured2, so 

 



 and 





 , and hence we prove the
theorem.
6.6 Summary
We have described the first fundamentally multi-participant quantum cryptography
protocol. In this multi-participant protocol, a new type of attack is possible. In section
6.5, we saw how to reduce these new attacks to the types we considered in chapter 2.
Finally, this gives security as long as the error rate is low enough to allow a code with
properties discussed at the end of chapter 3.

In the protocol, both fidelities are estimated by test measurements
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CHAPTER 7
An Experimental Realization of a Quantum
Anonymous Channel
7.1 Introduction
In chapter 6, we introduced a new quantum protocol and also proved that this protocol
is secure. Both the protocol as well as the proof of security are stated in a quantum
information theoretic language. In this chapter, we will give a variant of the protocol
in the language of quantum optics. We will see that this protocol is not beyond the
reach of current quantum optical technology.
7.2 Tools and Terminology
The polarization state of a photon is, to many physicists, the most common example of
a two level quantum system. We will discuss two polarization bases (see figure 7.1),





	

	
and 





 
	
. The second basis can be written in terms of the first:
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We will now describe an anonymous channel protocol in terms of physical pro-
cesses. We will forgo discussion of two aspects for now, namely production of sin-
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Figure 7.1: Two polarization bases
glet states:



  

	

	 	

 
 
, and performing polarization measurements in both
bases,        . We will discuss these aspects in sections 7.6 and 7.7.
In addition to polarization measurements and singlet production, we also need an
optical phase shifter (  ):




 



 

flffi


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Note that   is identity operation. We will make use of the shifter at either  
 fi
or
 
 
. We can see how it looks with  
 
:
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With these primitives, we can assemble a system which will allow us to perform the
anonymous channel protocol.
7.3 Experimental Procedure
We will assume that there are   participants in the protocol. As we saw in chapter 6,
the quantum phase of the protocol is really quite simple. We will describe it slightly
differently here.
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Source
Singlet
outgoing photon
Generator
Pulse
reference pulse

Figure 7.2: Starting a round of the experiment
Each participant, generally speaking, will make one of two actions: measurement
of the photon to perform a test (see figure 7.3), or phase shifting the photon to generate
a key (see figure 7.4). If no participant measures the photon in the        
	 basis,
the photon will be used to generate a key. One participant will be special in that he will
initiate and terminate each round. All the other participants will behave by the same
rules (see figure 7.6).
7.3.1 The First Participant
The first participant will start and finish each round. He will produce a singlet and a
reference pulse to trigger the other participants (see figure 7.2). He will measure the
photon in the 





 

	 basis with probability  
	

 
. With probability

 
, he will
measure in the 




	

	 basis. The optical fiber is arranged in a ring so it will even-
tually loop back to the first participant. When the reference pulse arrives back at his
lab, he will measure in the same basis that he did when he emitted the reference pulse.
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If he measures in the 
 


  

	 basis, and none of the other participants performs a
test measurement, the result of the measurement is the bit he will use for this round of
key generation. We now look at how the other participants behave.
7.3.2 Performing a Test Measurement
In addition to the polarized photon which will arrive via optical fiber, there is also a
bright reference pulse. The bright reference pulse does not make use of any of the
quantum principles; therefore, the signal may be amplified and measured by eaves-
droppers. In order to reduce the effects of dark counts, the photo-detector is triggered
by the reference pulse. Examining figure 7.3, we see that, in addition to measuring
the incoming photon, a second photon is emitted by creating a singlet and measuring
one of the photons in the singlet pair. Of course, since the next participant will use the
reference pulse to time his measurement (should he make one), each participant must
be careful to make sure that the his photon output is properly timed with the reference
pulse.
7.3.3 Generating a Key
If no one performs a test measurement, the photon is used to form the shared key which
will be used in the protocol. If the participant does not perform a test measurement,
he applies one of two phase shifts with equal probability. If the participant applied
the phase shift  , he counts the value zero as his bit for this round of the key. If he
applied 
	 , he counts the bit as one. One such device that can be electrically triggered
to produce exactly such a phase shift is a Pockels Cell.
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 
incoming photon
Source
Singlet
 
outgoing photon
reference pulse
Figure 7.3: Test measurement procedure
incoming photon
reference pulse
outgoing photon
Phase Shifter

Figure 7.4: Phase shift (   , 
	 ) to generate key
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Incoming photon Output probability P
Output probability (1-P)
P-Silvered Mirror
Figure 7.5: P-silvered mirror to randomly select test photons
7.4 Handling the Random Testing
As discussed in section 7.3.2, each photon needs to be tested with probability   5   .
How can this be accomplished? One may use an electro-optical switch which can
route photons between one of two positions. One position would reflect the beam
toward the test measurement device; the other position would reflect the beam into the
phase shifter (see section 7.3.3). A simpler method would be to use a partially silvered
mirror for the incoming beam (see figure 7.5). In this case, the partially silvered mirror
could be produced to reflect the photon with probability  , and to pass the photon with
probability   	  . If the photon is reflected into the test apparatus (see figure 7.3),
the detectors would detect a photon. If no photon is detected, we can assume that it
was not a test. This setup could resolve two difficulties. First, there is no need for a
random number generator to select photons for testing. Second, there is no need for
a mechanical routing of the photon into the testing or keying arms of the experiment.
However, the routing difficulty is not completely resolved, since recombining the beam
as the photon is leaving the experiment (see figure 7.6) would still require some kind
142
 
Source
Singlet
 
incoming photon outgoing photon

Phase Shifter
reference pulse
Figure 7.6: Full experimental setup for each participant
of electro-optical switch.
7.5 Processing the Results
After the experimental phase is complete, the participants are left with data. This data
is discussed according to the protocol to allow the participants to send anonymous
messages. First, each participant announces whether or not he tested. After all the
participants have made this announcement, each participant that performed a test an-
nounces the value of the the first measurement (see figure 7.3). After all the above
announcements are made, each participant that tested announces the result of their
second measurement. From these announcements, everyone can compute the error
rate between any two players. If the error rate between any two players is more than

  

1
, the protocol is aborted. Otherwise, they check the error rate of the non-test
results. They then take a random sampling of the non-test information (specifically,
which phase shifters each participant used and what measurements the first participant
made). Using this information, the error rate of the key material can be estimated. This
needs to be less than    	
 as well. If this is the case, the participants are ready to make
8
the details of the security result are given in chapter 6
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anonymous announcements.
As we saw in chapter 6, we use two linear codes,   and 

, such that 
fi
	





 
   
 
  These codes have parity check matrices 


 
. The code 

needs to
able to correct all the errors in the key material. The anonymous message is encoded
in 

by selecting a random element   of 

such that



 
 
, where

is the
anonymous message. Now each participant announces  

where

was the string
of his key material. By decoding the parity of all these announcements, one will learn
the parity of the messages. If only one person uses the channel, the result will be his
message. If a participant uses the channel, but the outcome does not decode to his
message, he waits a random time and tries again.
7.6 Producing Singlets Via Parametric Down Conversion
The singlet state






	

	  



  is often referred to as an EPR pair, named
after Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [EPR35]. It was the seemingly odd properties of
this state that Einstein called “spooky action at a distance” and caused him to doubt
quantum mechanics. In fact, the strange properties of such states, which we call en-
tangled, are fundamental to many quantum information processing tasks such as quan-
tum key distribution[Eke91], quantum state teleportation[BBC93a] and super-dense
coding[BW93]. Therefore, the production of such states is of great importance to ex-
perimental efforts in quantum information processing.
The basic experimental procedure for parametric down conversion is given in figure
7.7. A laser sends a beam of photons into a non-linear crystal. Two beams come out
of the crystal. By tuning various parameters (such as the wavelength and intensity
the of laser light, the cut of the crystal, etc...), the quantum entanglement of the two
emitted beams can be controlled. Energy and momentum are certainly conserved in
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Entangled photons output

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ff


Laser
Crystal
Figure 7.7: Parametric down conversion process
this process, and so the wavelength of the emitted beam is larger. Recently, these sorts
have experiments have been carried out by many groups[KWW99, ASS01, KCK01].
PDC is not, as of yet, a “push-button” process which can produce singlets pre-
cisely on demand. In the current protocol, we are measuring the second photon and
using PDC only to produce photons with random, but known, polarization. A system
has been recently demonstrated which produces photons “pseudo-on-demand”[PJF],
meaning that they can be made to appear in known polarizations at prearranged times.
This sort of system would be suitable for implementation of the current protocol.
It should be noted that, if the input beam does not contain exactly one photon,
the output will have more than one photon in each beam. In order to fit the protocol,
we need exactly one photon in each beam. This deviation from the ideal protocol has
been partially analyzed in the case of BB84[BLM00, L99], and some results have been
obtained by assuming that Eve may only do single-photon interactions. Full security
results for such practical schemes is an open problem.
7.7 Performing Polarization Measurements
In the experimental procedure we have described in this chapter, we make use of mea-
surements of photon polarization. It may not be immediately clear how this is to be
performed. It is, in fact, quite simple.
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The photon to be measured is sent through a polarization beam splitter. This device
reflects photons of one polarization, and lets photons of the orthogonal polarization
through. If photo-detectors are positioned in the paths that the photon might take in
each case, then when a detector measures a photon, the polarization is known by which
detector was activated (see figure 7.8). In the figure, we give an example of measuring
the photon in the 
 


	

	 basis; however, by changing the configuration of the
polarization beam splitter, this method can be adapted to any basis.






	

 

 
 
 
 



Detector
Detector
 

 
 
 
 






Polarization Beam Splitter
Figure 7.8: Measurement in the H,V basis:   
7.8 Summary
We have given a prescription for how the protocol described in chapter 6 might be real-
ized with current experimental techniques. While there have been many experimental
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implementations of quantum key distribution, this protocol is the first quantum secu-
rity protocol to use more than two participants. As such, demonstration of this protocol
will present interesting experimental challenges. The rate at which the protocol could
proceed is limited by the rate of the processes described in sections 7.3.3 and 7.3.2.
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